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NATIONAL SECURITY RULES: AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION OF LAW AND WAR
Kyle L. Greene*
ABSTRACT
Contemporary debates over the appropriate allocation of war powers between
the political branches overemphasize the rigidity of the Constitution’s framework.
This style of academic discussion sacrifices the lessons of practice in search of
steadfast, yet empty, principles. Even beyond the practical failings of this approach,
there is no constitutional basis for the notion that either Congress or the President
has a singular, fixed role when dealing with national security issues.
In fact, the Founders developed a constitutional structure capable of continually
reshaping—within parameters—the government’s division of national security
power to match the nation’s security challenges. Rather than scouring the
constitutional text and the historical record for a concrete legal dictate on
congressional or presidential supremacy, we should instead look to text, history, and
structure for guidance on how the political branches can legitimately and
affirmatively negotiate their emergent responsibilities.
This Article does exactly that, beginning with the capacious and forwardlooking text of the Constitution and then analyzing actions taken by the political
branches during the early years of the nation, the Civil War, and the mid-20th
century. No easy answers appear, but certain consistent rules and best practices
emerge that demonstrate the Constitution’s power to cohere American law and
strategy. That is, as long as our elected leaders are up to the task.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem.1
The founding generation had just finished fighting a war when they ordained
and established our new nation’s Constitution, and war was never far from the minds
of the men who wrote that enduring and generative text. Accordingly, the
Constitution enacted a cohesive geostrategy grounded in the preservation of: (1)
geographically isolated political union to defend American liberty from foreign
threats, and (2) a hybrid federal-state military under the control of civilian leadership
to preserve that liberty from domestic despotism.2 Yet the Constitution also endorsed
a flexible legal order that could effectively carry out American geostrategy going
*

J.D., Columbia Law School, 2020; B.A., University of Massachusetts, 2016. Thank you to the many
people who have helped me to think more carefully and clearly about the law. For this Article, I owe a
particular debt to the excellent teaching and scholarship of Akhil Amar and Matthew Waxman, and to
the invaluable writing of Philip Bobbitt.
1. “[This hand] seeks with the sword a quiet peace under liberty.” The History of the Arms and
Great Seal of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SEC’Y OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., https://
www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/presea/sealhis.htm [https://perma.cc/R2UM-BE6V] (last visited Apr. 12,
2021).
2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 44-51 (2005).
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forward. The Constitution divides national security powers between the political
branches according, approximately, to each branch’s comparative advantage over the
other, but it provides no rigid, textual algorithm to decide just how far those powers
reach or what to do when they overlap. Therefore, the Founders—although
particular about the appropriate geostrategic framework for their day—did not set
down so ironclad a set of legal rules and restrictions that future protectors of the
nation and Constitution would be unable to adapt to changed strategic realities.
The Founders’ geostrategic plan faced intense pressures during the early
decades of the nation’s existence, but the basic premises of their national security
strategy—and the key elements of the accordant legal order established by the
Constitution—proved solid. However, as the Founders expected, America’s
geostrategic position has evolved in dramatic ways throughout the long years from
1788 until today. As the decades turned into centuries, looming threats to the
domestic security of the American people have become increasingly varied and
catastrophic.3 At the same time, America’s national interests have become
increasingly global and complex. 4 It would have been impossible to meet these
substantial challenges to American national security with the exact constitutional
order of the late 1700s, and, thankfully, the nation’s strategy and law have both been
characterized by growth rather than stasis.
Over time, therefore, the rough division of responsibilities between the President
and the Congress has been continually reforged in response to the external
impositions of shifting threats and sudden catastrophes. These events often spur the
President to act in forceful and novel ways, but nonetheless to act with an eye toward
the many congressional and judicial counterweights that ensure a continued
equilibrium of security and democracy under the Constitution.5 This dynamic—
occurring primarily between the political branches and constrained by text and
structure—is a constitutional process of national security calibration that
legitimately incorporates geostrategic avulsion into an evolving legal order. It
reflects the Founders’ careful coordination of Revolutionary War-era geostrategy
with constitutional law and their decision to provide a versatile, adaptable legal
structure capable of recreating such calibrated coordination in the future.6 And it has

3. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 86
(2008) (“New strategic threats are arising owing to the proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery
systems that make every state, whether it has nearby enemies or not, and whether its borders are
otherwise secure, vulnerable. . . .”). Bobbitt points out additional threats to civilians, including cyber,
biological, and radiological weapons. Id. at 99.
4. See, e.g., ANDREW KENT & JULIA DAVIS MORTENSON, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 283 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (“Partly [the
increase of presidential unilateralism] came in response to massively increasing stakes and complexity
of modern foreign policy.”).
5. See DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND CONGRESS
1776 TO ISIS 426 (2016) (“[P]residents have time and time again recognized the danger . . . that inheres
in the idea that decisions about the conduct of war are theirs alone to make. And so they have struggled
to find ways to conduct war that have not depended on the view that they possess uncheckable war time
powers.”).
6. Or as another graduate of Columbia Law School put it:
It has been said that the [C]onstitution marches. That is, there are constantly new
applications of unchanged powers, and it is ascertained that in novel and complex
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limits.7 If either the President or Congress deviate too far from good-faith
participation in the process, then the other political branch can choose to abandon its
own collaborative posture by invoking core constitutional war powers, petitioning
the courts for assistance, or turning to the electoral check of public opprobrium.
Even if this iterative process sounds plausible as a conceptual description of how
constitutional national security has evolved, actionable insights only emerge from a
more careful examination of American history. One must, therefore, analyze how
specific episodes of national security stress have driven the process of constitutional
calibration forward. The entire breadth of that story is well beyond the scope of a
single article. Instead, this Article makes an incremental contribution to our
collective knowledge by analyzing key events and ideas from three influential
periods: early America, the Civil War, and the post-World War II 20th century.
Each of these periods posed momentous national security problems, and this
Article looks at what happened—to America and to the Constitution—during each.
I argue that, apart from the continued relevance and application of a few core powers,
the efficacy of national security law has been maintained and renewed through
presidential and congressional participation in an interbranch constitutional process
that attempts to match the strategic context of the moment with a corresponding
division of national security powers and responsibilities. 8 Although my focus
necessarily involves discussing the normative valence of specific actions, the point
is not to take a red pen to history and grade how America handled each event that I
come across. The point is to sharpen our understanding of the process that has, in
practice, guided the political branches as they cohered war, security, law, and the
Constitution throughout American history.
In Part II, I engage closely with the text of the Constitution and sketch out the
Founders’ original vision of geostrategy and national security. In Part III, I highlight
early moments in American history that challenged and reinforced this picture, and
I caution against drawing anachronistic lessons about presidential or congressional
predominance from this period. In Part IV, I delve into the complex and fraught
issues of the Civil War and describe how it led to the first tectonic changes in the
process of constitutional calibration, creating constitutional upheavals that continue
to shape today’s national security landscape. In Part V, I take up events following
World War II and analyze how the obligations and options associated with America’s
situations, the old grants contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and
adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting [C]onstitution.
Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 2 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 18 (1917) (emphasis
omitted).
7. Although I admit that a statement like “[w]hen national emergencies strike, the executive acts,
Congress acquiesces, and courts defer” might sketch a rough outline of the constitutional process, such
an account fails to reflect the many law-sensitive considerations each participant carefully engages with.
Posner and Vermeule, the quoted authors, downplay legality in favor of “rationality.” ERIC A. POSNER
& ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 3-5 (2007).
But our constitutional system deserves, and demands, much more than mere contingent rationality.
8. With this approach, I hope to strike a path around the war powers debate that is typically
traveled by more committed pro-Congress or pro-Executive scholars. That debate has so far proved
interminable, which one should expect when the resolution up for debate—“To which branch did the
Constitution ultimately assign the predominant role in war?”—is one that the Constitution, wisely, gave
no answer to.
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status as a global superpower have strained the traditional framework of
constitutional national security. Finally, in Part VI, I conclude the Article with some
reflections and discuss whether modern political and strategic developments have
finally overwhelmed the ability of this constitutional process to effectively update
the nation’s legal order.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL GEOSTRATEGY AND COMPLEMENTARY GOVERNMENT POWERS
America is subject to a considerable array of paternal claims, but her midwife
was undoubtedly war. Naturally, the Founding Fathers were fixated on national
security. Many of the principal goals of the Constitution, as listed in the document’s
vigorous Preamble, were relevant to national security 9: to “provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty.” 10 The
text, history, and structure of the Constitution together demonstrate that the
Founders’ plan to secure America against external threats depended on the three
pillars of political unity, territorial integrity, and naval force. Fully interwoven with
this vision of defense against foreign threats, the Founders’ Constitution
simultaneously sought to create a military apparatus that would fulfill its defensive
purpose without raising the specter of domestic, military tyranny. But how to do so?
Instead of relying on a large and powerful standing army, the Constitution vested
Congress with the power to “raise and support Armies” with funding that could last
“no more than two Years[,]”11 and a more open-ended power to “provide and
maintain a Navy”12 with no term limits on appropriations. The particular verbs and
nouns chosen—“provide and maintain a Navy” against “raise and support Armies”
(Armies!)—pointed to a permanent, preferred naval force and temporary, successive
land forces. Any resulting deficit of land troops could be met by Congress “calling
forth the Militia”13 as needed to enforce the laws or put down rebellion. Thus, there
is a well-organized plan in Article I for defending the nation by using the navy—and
calling out the state militias as a secondary resort14—rather than by depending on a
perpetual, national land army.15
In several of the early Federalist Papers, the strategic and structural logic behind
the textual preference for navy over army was developed at greater length and
directly linked to the Founders’ strong focus on national unity. Alexander Hamilton
and John Jay warned that disunity between the states would be a sufficient predicate
9. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74 (1990) (“From the beginning, our Constitution has been obsessed
with the idea of national security . . . .”); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
27 (2012) (describing John Marshall’s analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland that “[t]he central purpose of
the Constitution was to safeguard national security”).
10. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
14. See FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To render an army unnecessary [by
maintaining a well-regulated militia], will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a
thousand prohibitions upon paper.”).
15. See FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (“Next to the effectual establishment of the Union,
the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which
revenue may be appropriated to their support.”).
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for a fearful and jealous mood to arise on the continent, inexorably leading to
standing land armies16 and foreign alliances17 as the states sought to protect
themselves against one another. Powerful standing armies would, in turn, lead
directly to a diminution of personal liberties and rights wherever those armies
existed.18 Therefore, if the several states in America wished to avoid internecine
conflict on the continent and the collapse of civil and political liberties within their
borders, they would need to unite and jealously preserve the strength of their union.
Then, the United States of America could enjoy the benefits of a navy-guarded island
nation like Great Britain: “An insular situation, and a powerful marine, [to guard] it
in great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion [and] supersede the
necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom.”19 In summary, the Founders
thought that if America could remain a stable political union with territorial control
over the continent, then the Atlantic Ocean and the American navy could easily
handle any external threats without the nation needing recourse to a libertythreatening standing army.20
The legal order that the Founders paired with this strategic plan divided civilian
control over national security powers and the military between Congress and the
President. Congress, through the specific enumerations of Article I, was primarily
given constitutive national security powers: the sort of powers necessary to create,
fund, and regulate the military. 21 Some of these creative powers—to raise armies,
maintain the navy, and nationalize the state militias in certain circumstances—were
already discussed above. These military-specific funding powers are a specialized
instantiation of Congress’s greater power of the purse, often its most potent tool for

16. See FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (“But standing armies, it may be replied, must
inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which
require a state of constant preparation, will infallibly produce them.”).
17. See FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay) (“Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more
natural for these [independent] confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant
nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of
foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves.”).
18. See FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 16 (“The violent destruction of life and property incident to
war . . . will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions
[standing armies] which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.”).
19. Id.; see also FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay) (“[U]nion and a good national government . . . will
tend to repress and discourage [war]. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense . . . .”).
20. George Washington would re-articulate the logic of the Federalist Papers in his farewell
address to the nation: “[A]ll the parts [of the country] combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of
means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater security from external
danger, [and] a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations” all without the “necessity of
those overgrown military establishments, which under any form of government are inauspicious to
liberty, and . . . [especially] hostile to Republican Liberty . . . .” George Washington, Washington’s
Farewell Address (Sep. 19, 1796).
21. It is worth noting that, when one moves from focusing on war to national or homeland security
writ large, additional congressional powers also have important national security implications. For
instance, the interstate Commerce Clause vests Congress with broad power to regulate a vast array of
activities with spillover effects that traverse federal or state borders. Or, consider what the Necessary
and Proper Clause portends for gap-filling legislative power when Congress has already been vested
with powers to declare war and raise armies.
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setting national policy related to security22 or other issues.23 In addition to its
straightforwardly creative powers, Congress also has enumerated regulatory powers
over the military—“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces”24—that afford Congress prospective, attenuated control over even
day-to-day military structures and activities. Finally, Congress’s most obvious
national security power is the body’s much-debated ability to “declare War” and
thereby commit the nation to an all-out conflict.25
In contrast, the Constitution gave the President a set of directory national
security powers: the sort of powers necessary to superintend, manage, and command
the nation’s security apparatus. The Articles of Confederation had previously vested
these traditionally executive powers over foreign affairs with the Continental
Congress, but the plodding, multi-member body had been ill-suited for their
exercise.26 The new Constitution recognized the need for a more energetic wielder
of executive power, and thus created the office of the President to ensure that a single,
active commander had ultimate control over the armed forces.27 Still, the President’s
powers are less clearly defined in the Constitution’s text and so their contours—more
dependent on structural, historical, and prudential considerations—appear both more
expansive and more fragile than those of Congress.28
Nonetheless, the solid text of several Article II provisions stands out. First, no
discussion of presidential powers can take place without noting that the President—
vested with the “executive Power”29—is broadly and ultimately responsible for
carrying out the laws of the United States and keeping the nation running. 30 Next,
pursuant to Section I of Article II, the President must swear an oath to “faithfully
execute the Office of President” and “preserve, protect, and defend the
22. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION
(2017) (“Congress has, in fact, repeatedly used its power of the purse to end, limit, or
forestall military action.”).
23. See id. at 66 (“[I]t is a mistake to think about the congressional power of the purse solely in
terms of Congress’s power to determine spending levels. Control over spending also provides Congress
with significant leverage to use in negotiations over other policies . . . .”).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. This clause also includes the power to incorporate the civilian
fleets of America into armed naval service through letters of marque and reprisal, which fits neatly with
the rest of Congress’s constitutive powers and suggests that the Framers intended Congress to be able to
commit U.S. forces to conflict short of declaring total war.
26. See Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231, 277-78 (2001).
27. See FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Energy in the Executive . . . is essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”); FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”).
28. Speaking of this phenomenon at the macrolevel of the Constitution, Amar writes: “Thanks to
its gap and silences, Article II in effect delegated authority to the political branches to negotiate more
concrete settlements.” AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 197.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
30. Barrels of ink have been spilled writing about the extent of the President’s Article II executive
power, which contains no restrictive qualification—as do Congress’s Article I legislative powers—to
those powers “herein granted” in the rest of the text. I see little hope that I could advance the debate
much by dwelling on it here, and the ideas and arguments in this Article do not depend on a particularly
polarized view of the quantum of power granted by the Executive Vesting Clause.

OF POWERS 74
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Constitution.”31 There is a contested argument that this language grants the President
additional, affirmative powers as necessary to fulfill the oath, but it is more plausible
that the oath instead provides a firm ground for the President to lawfully decline to
execute unconstitutional legislative action.32
The language of Section II is a crucial addition to the President’s national
security role. It appoints the President as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States [and of the State Militias when called into service,]” 33
which at least indicates the President’s authority to prosecute war by deploying
troops and making tactical decisions during conflict,34 but says little about precisely
when that command authority begins or ends.35 However, it can be safely stated that
the President’s command authority is activated if Congress declares war or the nation
suffers a sudden attack.36 Finally, in Section III, yet another provision—that the
President “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” 37—arguably gives the
President an additional grant of broad authority to undertake whatever measures are
needed to ensure federal laws are enforced. But, on a more cautious reading, the
Take Care Clause instead obligates the President to interpret and execute dulyenacted constitutional laws on behalf of Congress and to use his available existing
powers to overcome any barriers to that fruitful execution. 38

31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
32. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 178-80 (describing that presidential
fidelity to the oath and the Constitution could lead the President to properly decline to execute an
unlawful statute); Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Laws, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199, 200 (1994).
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
34. The Commander in Chief power, juxtaposed against the congressional power to “declare war,”
is often described as the power to “make war.” See, e.g., DARREN WHEELER, CONGRESS AND THE WAR
ON TERROR: MAKING POLICY FOR THE LONG WAR 5 (2018) (“[The Commander in Chief power] can, at
a minimum, be safely described as the ability to make war.”).
35. The decision to vest the tactical power to “make war” with the executive rather than the
legislative branch was a conscious amendment, proposed by James Madison and Elbridge Gerry, to
earlier drafts of the Constitution. The Framers wanted to ensure that the nation could act with the speed
necessary to repel a sudden attack. Yet it was just as conscious a decision to leave the power to “declare
war” with Congress. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6-7 (1995).
36. There is no doubt that the President can unilaterally spring into action when the nation is
attacked. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 188 (“The power to direct America’s
professional troops entailed, at a minimum, authority to deploy these men to repel sudden invasions,
even in the absence of prior legislative authorization.”). I would add to this only that there is at least
some form of authorization for even this fundamental form of defensive action—the existence of
professional troops to deploy. See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“[The United States] shall protect each
of [the States] against Invasion.”). The Article IV protective obligation that the United States owes to
the states is a clear indication that the President and military might be constitutionally required to
respond to attacks even without congressional pre-approval. Still, one should not exaggerate the scope
of implied presidential emergency powers by overinterpreting how energetic the office was meant to be
or how far the executive power and Take Care Clause reach. After all, while “inherent” emergency
powers can undoubtedly be located in constitutional design, history, practice, etc., such powers are not
defined expansively—or expressly at all—in the text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
38. This is a stronger reading of the clause and has essentially the inverse import of the Oath of
Office. Where the oath permits the President not to execute unconstitutional laws, the Take Care Clause
requires the President to execute constitutional laws. At times, this might require assertive, even
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Armed with the Founders’ geostrategic vision and the relevant text of the
Constitution, it is possible to make some initial observations about the basic rules of
constitutional national security. Congress—in light of its specific constitutive
powers of creation, appropriation, and regulation—is responsible for making
foundational, ex ante decisions about the capabilities and structure of American
military forces. This authority dominates national security up until the moment when
a conflict actually breaks out. After the nation is embroiled in conflict—whether
through congressional authorization or the President’s response to an attack—the
enumerated congressional role largely subsides to the borders of the regulations it
had previously passed, whatever ongoing appropriations decisions it has to make,
and any lawful proscriptions that it can still impose. Meanwhile, the President—in
light of his general directory powers of superintendence, management, and
command—has only a restrained role to play during peacetime. But when the nation
is engaged in conflict, the President, now fully engaged in the office of Commander
in Chief, obtains broad discretion to prosecute the conflict as he sees fit—as long as
he continues to act in the interest of the nation and its laws.
There is a great deal of clarity in this textual scheme. In practice, however, these
powers do not operate in such sharp isolation from one another, and the President
and Congress typically have reverberating opportunities to coordinate with and
respond to one another. Still, the President appears likely to possess an advantage in
decisiveness and finality. Congress, although in charge of forging additional
national security capabilities for the President to use, has difficulty controlling their
use once finished. When it comes to the use of those capabilities, the President often
moves first—reacting to any sudden attacks and emergencies—and always moves
last—deciding if, when, and how to actually make use of the options that Congress
develops.39
However, this analysis does not mean that the President enjoys unchecked power
to act in the name of national security or that the President will prevail in every
dispute with Congress (or the courts). 40 Even if the relative structure of the
Constitution creates a more assertive and active executive than it does a legislature,
it remains certain that the President has “no legal source of authority except those
unilateral, actions on behalf of the federal government, but whatever the President does must still stem
from a legitimate, constitutional basis.
39. Cf. Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility:
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1390 (1994). Bobbitt
writes that “[a]s a structural matter, Congress has the first and last word. It must provide forces before
the President can commence hostilities, and it can remove those forces, by decommissioning them or by
forbidding their use in pursuit of a particular policy at any time.” Id. at 1391. But Bobbitt continues,
“once Congress has provided such forces, however, they are the President’s to command so long as they
are used to enforce the laws and treaties of the United States . . . the President may validly commit U.S.
forces without further returning to Congress for fresh mandates beyond those given by statutes.” Id. at
1391-92.
40. Academic separation of powers analysis often reasons from textual powers—with some
carefully selected originalist gloss—right to a discussion of whether Congress or the President should
have the upper hand in a direct, interbranch conflict. But, as this Article describes, the structure, the
historical practice, and the strategic practicalities of implementing the Constitution are more often the
determinative factors. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR 32 (2016) (discussing that text, while incontestable,
provides no definitive rubric for every constitutional decision).
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created by and within the constitutional system.”41 Thus, while the President can use
the office’s constitutional and statutory authority for many and various ends, he must
always plausibly identify the authority supporting his actions and publicly defend
the legality and wisdom of the chosen course.
In the long-run, only this forthright behavior will ensure that Congress—and the
public—continue to preserve and provide security capabilities for the President to
use. The most contentious and difficult questions for the nation’s legal order arise,
therefore, when the factual predicates of the Constitution’s geostrategic plan cease
to apply but Congress has not yet corrected the resulting fracture between world and
law. Then, the political branches must scramble to align strategy with legality, and
the potential for discord between Congress and the President is most pronounced. 42
It is in these instances—increasing in urgency and discordance over time—that the
process of constitutional calibration is fully tested and critically important.
III. EARLY AMERICAN PRACTICE
The nation’s early history is littered with illustrative events that provide insight
into the Founders’ geostrategic and constitutional vision.43 Due to the individuals
involved in these events, and their nearness in time to the ratification of the
Constitution, these occasions elucidate the implicit rationale and structure embedded
in the text of the Constitution. The presidential practice of the era is particularly
informative. This Article considers three examples: (1) George Washington and the
Whiskey Rebellion, (2) John Adams and the Quasi-War with France, and (3) Thomas
Jefferson and the nation’s first conflict with the Barbary pirates. If there is a theme
that captures this era, it is that the process of constitutional calibration led to a
national security practice that satisfied congressional constraints and amplified
presidential powers. While the nation’s early presidents were careful to respect their
constitutional obligations to act lawfully and defer to the exercise of congressional
authority, they nonetheless consistently emerged as the dominant force in national
security decision-making.44
A. George Washington and the Whiskey Rebellion
George Washington’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 is a textbook
exemplar of the political branches using the flexibility of the Constitution to
reallocate national security power from the legislature to the executive branch.
After Congress passed an excise tax on distilled whiskey in 1791, a small
rebellion began to ferment in western Pennsylvania. Soon enough, farmers began to
41. Id. at 47-48.
42. “Is this kind of system sufficient?” is an alluring but unhelpful question. One might wish that a
nation of laws could establish an ex ante˗certified legal response for each potential state of the world.
But if we exhausted every ream of paper on the planet, we would still have failed to extend the reach of
our function to next Wednesday. Perhaps an artificial intelligence with extraordinary superhuman
powers will one day be capable of the task. Until then, our nation of laws will depend on sound
judgment and forthright justification, as it always has.
43. See KOH, supra note 9, at 77 (arguing that despite America’s geographic separation from
European powers in the early years of the Republic, “foreign sovereigns inevitably began to breach the
cordon sanitaire” and “it quickly became apparent that the Congress was poorly structured to respond”).
44. Id. at 77-81.
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violently resist tax collectors and other federal agents.45 Although the resistance was
limited, the federal government worried that it might take root and spread to nearby
rural areas.46 Washington employed a light touch with the insurgents for several
years, but he began to take a more aggressive approach in 1794. Relying on the
Calling Forth Act of 1792—which allowed the President to call out the militia of the
several states to enforce the federal laws when resistance consisted of “combinations
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” 47—
Washington brought out militiamen from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and
Maryland to suppress the rebels.48 Recall that Article I of the Constitution gives
Congress the power to call forth the militia; 49 thus, the Calling Forth Act of 1792
was a notably quick delegation of this authority to the President. Washington, acting
faithfully to the other branches in return, obtained judicial approval before calling
forth the militia and sought legislative reauthorization for the militia deployment
when Congress was back in session in full compliance with the requirements of
Section 2 of the Act.50
Following the Whiskey Rebellion, Congress reenacted the time-limited 1792
Calling Forth Act as the 1795 Militia Act. The 1795 revisions to the original Act
made the delegation permanent and removed the requirement that the President first
obtain judicial approval before calling forth the militia, leaving the decision of
whether there was a qualifying situation to the discretion of the President. 51 This
interactive series—congressional delegation to the President, followed by
presidential adherence to statutory limits, 52 and then even further delegation to the
President—is a powerful display of the political branches jointly developing legal
innovations that better address security concerns and strategic needs.
B. John Adams and the Quasi-War
The actions taken by John Adams and Congress during the 1798 Quasi-War
represent another interesting set of back-and-forth constitutional maneuvers.
45. FISHER, supra note 35, at 16-17.
46. Id.
47. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (expired 1794).
48. Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 161
(2004).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
50. Vladeck, supra note 48, at 160-61.
51. Id. at 162. Additionally, the 1795 Act removed the requirement that the President only call out
militias from states other than the location of the resistance when Congress was not in session, and it
removed the requirement that the President publish a proclamation that he intended to call out the militia
prior to actually doing so. Id.; see Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 424, 424 (repealed and
superseded by statute in 1903).
52. In one respect, however, Washington did act without receiving express congressional approval.
Given that Washington called forth the militia and brought it into the field with Congress out of session,
there was no funding allocated for that specific mission. Thus, Washington used funds that had been
appropriated for the army instead. Washington immediately reported this to Congress upon the militia’s
return, and Congress commended him and granted the necessary appropriations. Richard D. Rosen,
Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the
Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 104 (1998). This particular interaction between the President and Congress
is an early and important precedent for the type of actions that Lincoln would take at the outset of the
Civil War.
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Tensions flared between America and revolutionary France after the United States
took up a friendlier posture toward Great Britain with the Neutrality Proclamation
and 1794 Jay Treaty. French naval forces soon began to attack and seize American
ships engaged in trade with Britain, and the old Franco-American friendship rapidly
deteriorated.53 Adams, lacking a sufficient naval force to defend against the French
and fearful of further escalation, turned to Congress and asked the legislature to
provide him with the forces necessary to meet this aggression. 54 Pro-French
Republicans in Congress initially resisted the military buildup and pressured the
Adams administration to release the contents of its private negotiations with France,
but those papers—many of them penned by future Chief Justice John Marshall—
revealed the arrogance of the French negotiators and incited public passions in the
direction of war.55
Over the course of the next few years, Congress—without ever declaring war—
authorized John Adams to raise additional military units, purchase additional
gunships, set up the Department of the Navy, and respond to the escalating problem
with the French.56 But Congress was wary of ceding too much control to the
President. The statutes included specific terms to limit the scope of the conflict,
proscribing the newly-created naval forces from use except in “particular sorts of
actions against French vessels, in particular locations, for particular purposes.” 57
Two interpretations of the Quasi-War with France—relying on similar substance
but contrasting in their focus—are often offered. One emphasizes that Congress
never declared a war, but John Adams nevertheless prosecuted one. 58 The second
emphasizes that Congress passed several statutes initiating and limiting the scope of
war, limits that Adams and the courts deferred to.59 At this point, there is no
necessary tension between the two factually accurate descriptions. But they quickly
begin to diverge. The Quasi-War, given an adversarial framing by modern
academics, turns into a study of which of the political branches has relatively more

53. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at
239 (David M. Kennedy ed., 2009).
54. Id. at 240 (“President Adams called a special session of Congress . . . [and] urged a buildup of
American military forces, especially the navy.”).
55. See JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 169-81
(2018).
56. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 964-67 (2008). At times during the Quasi-War,
Congress—especially Federalists in Adams’s own party—took an even more aggressive stance toward
France than the President himself. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power
to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV 695, 749-52 (1997).
57. Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 967.
58. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 292 (1996) (“The Quasi-War further supports the conclusion that a
declaration of war was not understood as necessary for authorizing combat. . . . Not seeking a
declaration was a deliberate decision of President John Adams . . . . As we have seen, the Framers left
the crucial decisions in war to the President . . . .”).
59. See FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 35, at 17-18 (“Much has been made of the
President’s authority to engage the country in undeclared wars, such as the “quasi-war” with France . . .
but the reference to the war in France is clearly false. Congress debated the prospect of war openly and
enacted a number of bills to put the country on a war footing. . . . In authorizing war, Congress may
place limits on what Presidents may and may not do.”).
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potent constitutional powers to dictate the contours of war. Either affirmative answer
ends up unhelpfully heavy-handed.60 The precedent of the Quasi-War is better
understood by beginning with a more prosaic question about what actually took
place: Did Congress and the President exercise their powers counter to each other
until one branch won out over the other, or did the two branches reach a cooperative
posture and develop a robust and lawful national response?
As discussed previously, Congress’s main powers are constitutive. Meanwhile,
the nation’s 1798 military apparatus was meager. Thus, the statutes passed by
Congress—although imposing legal limits—were substantial affordances of
practical power to President Adams. 61 One might call this a show of congressional
preeminence, but Congress was able to impose legal limits on Adams only in concert
with the clearly constitutive, pro-executive decision to create the military that Adams
had requested. Or one might call it a show of presidential preeminence, but the
President’s newfound de facto command over military forces was dependent on a
specific, demanding exercise of congressional constitutive powers. So, a more evenhanded synthesis: the Quasi-War did not subtly reveal which branch has the
predominant constitutional powers. Instead, it showed the legislature and executive
exercising their relative competencies: Congress creating and the President
commanding.
Beyond that, the Quasi-War shows how the exercise of those competencies is
affected by context. If the object of command is only available to the President when
Congress first creates bespoke forces, then we can expect that congressional
influence on the range of command choices available to the President will be
heightened. Furthermore, the Quasi-War demonstrated the vitality of the
constitutional process that was implicit in the text and fast becoming explicit through
practice. The President recognized an emerging threat to the nation, Congress and
the public agreed that the President needed more options to meet that threat, and so
Congress cautiously created additional military forces for the President to
command.62
The President, in good faith, made use of those capabilities and respected their
limits.63 The Quasi-War evinces that, from the start, the Constitution has encouraged
the executive and legislative branches to be active participants in a collaborative
process of national security calibration rather than locked in a constitutional
wrestling match.64 We should not overemphasize the partisan aspects of the Quasi60. Especially those who describe the Quasi-War in unflinchingly pro-Congress terms. See, e.g.,
Louis Fisher, Basic Principles of the War Power, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 319, 329 (2012) (“The
Quasi-War of 1798 underscored the primary authority of Congress over war.”). Contrary to Fisher, I
believe the Quasi-War underscores the primary authority of Congress over a particular aspect of war—
creating and funding military forces.
61. See generally BARRON, supra note 5, at 41-53. Barron writes that Congress originally kept firm
ownership over its “right to declare war” by “simply refus[ing] to create a military.” Id. at 43. Congress
realized, and worried, that granting Adams’s request for a “large-scale military establishment” to contest
the French would give him the ability to choose war “in practice if not in law.” Id. at 44.
62. Id. at 52-53 (“Together, the new laws created an intricate legal framework of power but also
constraint.”).
63. Id. at 53 (“Adams and his men did their best to navigate the legal maze.”).
64. This collaborative spirit is visible even after the courts were called in. The judiciary had its
first moment in the national security sun during the Quasi-War, and it approved of both the nation’s

284

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

War response in order to draw ill-fitting conclusions about relative constitutional
supremacy and ‘settle’ the score of modern debates.
C. Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates
A third, and for present purposes final, case study of early national security
practice features the nation’s third president. Thomas Jefferson was a distinct
constitutional interpreter. His approach to the Constitution was avowedly historical 65
rather than textual, in contrast with Justice Story. 66 And Jefferson was interested in
individual clauses rather than overall structure, in contrast with Justice Marshall. 67
Jefferson’s constitutional approach, in sum, purported to care more about what
particular words meant and much less about what the whole of the text did. Further,
Jefferson, writing to his friend and ally James Madison in 1789, praised the new
Constitution for its “effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of
letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body.”68 So, out of all our
Founding Father presidents, one would most expect Jefferson to recoil from
participation in an interbranch “constitutional process” that went beyond the simple,
stable powers he understood to exist in the original document.
But Jefferson, as President, was not quite so austere a Commander in Chief.
Pirates from the Barbary States of North Africa—Tunis, Tripoli, Morocco, and
Algiers—had long plagued the commercial conduct of merchants in the
Mediterranean Sea.69 In the period before Jefferson came into office, the policy of
the United States had been to pay tribute to these nation-state pirates (privateers) in

capacity to wage war without declaring war and Congress’s power to define the scope of such a war. In
the leading case of Little v. Barreme, the Court held an American naval captain liable for damages for
following an executive branch order to attack ships going to or from French ports in contravention of
Congress’s authorization to attack ships only going to French ports. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). But
Congress, in keeping with the collaborative spirit of the Quasi-War, responded to this decision by
passing a statute that indemnified Captain Little for his misdeeds.
65. Specifically, Jefferson’s approach to the Constitution was historical in the sense of the
constitutional modalities. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7
(1982) (“Historical argument is argument that marshals the intent of the draftsmen of the Constitution
and the people who adopted the Constitution.”). Many associate this mode of analysis with originalism.
Then, Jefferson is the original originalist.
66. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 407, n.8
(1833) (“[Jefferson’s] second canon is, ‘On every question of construction [we should] carry ourselves
back to the time, when the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and
instead of trying, what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the
probable one, in which it was passed.’ Now, who does not see the utter looseness, and incoherence of
this canon. How are we to know, what was thought of particular clauses of the constitution at the time
of its adoption? . . . The people adopted the constitution according to the words of the text in their
reasonable interpretation, and not according to the private interpretation of any particular men.”)
67. See AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 22-31 (describing Marshall’s
“trademark brand of holistic analysis” exemplified by his decision in McCulloch v. Maryland); POWELL,
supra note 40, at 26-31 (“In addressing [McCulloch v. Maryland], Jefferson presupposed that the answer
could only be found through a clause-by-clause examination.”).
68. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 392-98 (Princeton Univ., eds., 1958). Note however, that this remark was in reference to
Congress’s appropriations power rather than its declare war power. Id.
69. See WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 634-36.
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exchange for the unmolested passage of its ships. 70 Even when tribute demands
ballooned to consume twenty percent of the federal budget, the Adams
administration continued to pay rather than fight back.71
Jefferson disapproved of this passive tact, and he assumed presidential office
ready to switch strategies.72 In short order, the President dispatched a squadron of
gunships across the Atlantic Ocean without obtaining specific congressional
authorization for the mission. 73 Some scholars claim that Jefferson’s actions were
nothing more than restrained defensive measures 74 and that he later had to be
compelled by Congress to take on the pirates in a committed, aggressive fashion. 75
Yet this eagerly pro-Congress view misses the forest through the trees. Jefferson—
an originalist with an avowedly skeptical view of the executive branch—sent
gunships across the Atlantic to battle against North African pirates without
congressional authorization as soon as he had the power to do so: the power of the
presidency. One can certainly call this defensive, as Jefferson did in public. But it
was a notable innovation in defensive action that brought executive branch-initiated,
global deployments of military force within the ambit of national defense.
The history of political branch machinations during the conflict with the Barbary
pirates makes almost no sense from the perspective of a modern reader searching for
the victor in an interbranch competition. A Republican President came to office
dissatisfied with the Federalist administration’s policy of appeasement and sent out
gunships without obtaining congressional authorization. But, because the President
was acting too defensively, Federalists in Congress soon pounced on the President’s
reticence and forced Republicans in Congress to grant him additional powers. It is
as if every other word has been randomly generated.
This bizarre political narrative returns to the realm of sensibility if the First
Barbary War is viewed as a sequential, executive-driven response to new strategic
developments rather than a breadcrumb indicating presidential or congressional war
powers supremacy. First, the two strategic developments that prompted Jefferson to
act as he did: (1) Congress had created a more robust standing navy during the
Adams administration, and (2) American economic interests now required the global
deployment of U.S. forces in order to rebuff increasingly rapacious predators. 76
Second, Jefferson exaggerated how defensive a stance he had asked the naval

70. Id. at 635-36.
71. Id. at 636.
72. Id. (“President Jefferson came to office . . . apparently determined to change American
policy.”).
73. See Alex J. Whitman, From the Shores of Tripoli to the Deserts of Iraq: Congress and the
President in Offensive and Defensive Wars, 13 U. OF PA. J. CONST. L. 1363, 1375 (2011).
74. See FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 35, at 27 (“For purely defensive
operations, Jefferson retained the right to act first and seek congressional approval later.”).
75. See id. at 25 (“Hamilton believed that Jefferson had defined executive power too narrowly.”);
WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 637 (“The Federalists, led by Hamilton in the press,
pounced on this reluctance and forced the Republican Congress in 1802 to grant the president authority
to use all means necessary to defeat the Tripolitan pirates.”).
76. See WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 634 (“[Before America’s independence, it]
had been protected by the British ﬂag. But with independence, America’s merchant ships became easy
prey for these Barbary pirates.”).
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forces to take in a performative show of fidelity to Congress. 77 Third, Congress
responded positively to this display of restraint by expressly authorizing Jefferson to
“fully equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States
as may be judged requisite” and to “instruct the commanders of the respective public
vessels aforesaid to subdue, seize, and make prize of all [Tripoli ships and assets.]”78
This was, yet again, a delegation of Congress’s constitutional powers to the
President. Jefferson, just like Washington and Adams before him, accrued additional
legal powers and military capacities to deal with a novel threat to the nation because
he highlighted his faithful acquiescence to congressional authority.
In total, these three early examples demonstrate several of the early features, and
outcomes, of the Constitution’s national security order. The political branches—
starting from their core constitutional powers and comparative advantages—
collaborated more than they clashed, and they used the flexibility afforded by the
Constitution to augment the presidential role. As previously summarized, the period
was characterized by presidential practice that satisfied congressional limits and
amplified executive power. Congress did not rely on its power to declare war as an
on-off switch, and the body’s most debated and crucial decisions were over whether
it should create and fund forces.
Congress repeatedly ceded its control over war by providing the President
military forces to command and even by delegating its creative powers directly to
him. In addition, presidents took defensive actions—a broader category than simply
repelling direct foreign attacks on the continent—without specific congressional preapproval or even funding. Nonetheless, these expansions of presidential power were
accompanied by careful adherence to exacting and specific congressional
authorizations. Partisans of the executive or legislative branch might be able to pull
this or that flashy quote or example to support a broad, polarized reading of textual
powers. But the straightforward precedent of the era is that the logic and structure
of the Constitution enabled, even demanded, political branch participation in a
collaborative process focused on prudently addressing new threats—a process that
yielded a more active executive.
IV. THE CIVIL WAR: THE EXISTENTIAL CHALLENGE OF INSURRECTION
The story of the Civil War is undoubtedly a story of slavery, federalism, and the
original sins of the Constitution. But there is also no doubt that the Civil War was
the single greatest threat to the Founders’ national security vision in American
history. The security of America had been built on the foundational precept of a
unified nation set safely apart from the rest of the world’s major powers across the
vast Atlantic Ocean. Yet, suddenly, there was an existential threat to America
rampaging within its own borders. Just as shocking, this internal threat came not
from the overreach of a despotic military junta but from a gathering coalition of
77. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33, 44 (1995) (“Jefferson
claimed [to Congress] that . . . under the Constitution, [the naval captain] could not go beyond the line
of defense . . . . Jefferson’s Cabinet felt that America was authorized to act offensively if attacked by
vessels of a State that declared or made war upon the United States . . . . Jefferson’s statement [to
Congress] was therefore factually erroneous and legally baseless.”).
78. Act of Feb. 06, 1802, ch. 4, § 1-2, 2 Stat. 129, 129-30.
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rebellious states. Thus, the syllogistic strength of the Constitution’s original
geostrategic conclusion fell apart as the Civil War rendered its premises false.
As the Constitution’s geostrategic plan faltered, it became apparent that a
minimal conception of its wartime legal order—comprised of orderly and static
distinctions between those few powers which were clearly vested with Congress or
the President—was likewise insufficient.79 The Civil War accelerated the
participation of the political branches in the process of recalibrating national security
powers and firmly supplemented the minimal conception with additional legal
tools:80 aggressive executive branch use of pre-existing legislation, the capacity for
the President to act as a temporary agent of Congress in certain situations, and robust
presidential emergency defense powers. These tools are all variations of the same
theme: if a substantial threat apprehends the nation when Congress has not yet used
its constitutive powers to address the threat, then it is appropriate for the President—
due to the active design of that office—to bridge the gap between those constitutive
shortfalls and the President’s own directory powers. Although the Civil War
prompted vast legal developments, these developments were rooted in the
Constitution’s text, in early American practice, and in the recognition that law and
war must remain mutually reinforcing constitutional partners.
Unfortunately, the story of presidential action and the Civil War begins before
Abraham Lincoln enters the picture. James Buchanan, in office from 1857 to 1861,
was a notoriously ineffective Commander in Chief. Buchanan was recklessly
passive, and his passivity allowed the emboldened pro-slavery South to gather
strength throughout his term.
Buchanan’s executive reticence reached an apex during the critical, feeble
months at the end of his presidential tenure. During this crucial time, the executive
branch convinced itself that it was enough to simply proclaim secession illegal while
refusing to take any actions to resist it.81 When South Carolina seceded in December
1860, Buchanan made essentially no defense of the union and stood by as rebels laid
siege to Fort Sumter.82 If actions were in short supply, so too were words. The most
forceful statement Buchanan could muster about the situation as he left office was
79. See KENT & MORTENSON, supra note 4, at 272 (“The existential crisis of the Civil War and
expansive constitutional vision of the presidency held by Abraham Lincoln inaugurated a new era in
executive-congressional relations and a new approach for the executive toward the problem of
authorization [for the use of military force].”).
80. See generally JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926).
Randall described three archetypical positions in the Civil War era war powers debate: (1) those who
thought a “strict interpretation… should be adopted which would disallow many of the measures taken
by the Government,” (2) those who thought “the Constitution is not operative during such a crisis as the
Civil War[,]” and (3) those who thought the Constitution remained binding but “sanctions extraordinary
powers.” Id. at 30-31. Randall ends this section by writing: “[i]t would be safe to sum up the
prevailing views of our judges by saying that the war powers are entirely consistent with the
Constitution, and that these war powers include all that is essential to the nation’s preservation.” Id. at
33.
81. BARRON, supra note 5, at 129 (“[Attorney General] Black and Buchanan clung to the view that
the cautious strategy they had pursued was wise. Secession remained illegal as a matter of official
policy.”).
82. Although Buchanan—under threat of an exodus of pro-Union members from his cabinet—
refrained from ordering Major Anderson to abandon Fort Sumter, he “refused to retaliate when a
steamer sent to supply Anderson was turned away under fire.” Id.at 123-27.
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directed against the North. Buchanan accused abolitionists of inciting slave revolts,
and conspiracy theories that repeated the charge soon swept across the South. 83
Buchanan’s timidity and sectional partiality demonstrate the danger of a President
who fails to react to urgent strategic developments and scrupulously denies the
opportunities for executive vigor in our constitutional system. 84
And then came Abraham Lincoln. By the time he took office in March of 1861,
seven states had already purported to secede from the Union. Lincoln, in his ringing
First Inaugural, defended the great and perpetual nature of the United States of
America and emphasized his duty as President to make sure that its law would be
faithfully executed, even in the South. 85 Still, Lincoln showed restraint, offering the
gathering Confederacy a final chance to peaceably return to the beneficial embrace
of the Union.86 But when Lincoln attempted to send provisions to the besieged
federal troops at Fort Sumter, militiamen from South Carolina stormed the outpost
before the provisions could arrive and forced the Union garrison to surrender. 87 April
was not yet halfway through, and the Civil War was joined. Congress was out of
session at the time, enjoying its customary spring recess. Thus, the nation’s survival
fell to Lincoln and, through a series of crucial actions, he both saved the Union and
initiated a drastic, executive branch-centered recalibration of constitutional national
security.88
President Lincoln’s first move was to supplement the woefully underprepared
U.S. military with additional fighting men. The day after Fort Sumter fell, Lincoln
called forth 75,000 militiamen to help suppress the secessionist states. 89 His April
15th proclamation decried the belligerence of the rebels and named their refusal to
allow the laws of the United States to be executed a “combination[] too powerful to
be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”90 In the same
proclamation, Lincoln requested that Congress meet for an emergency session on

83. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 201 (2012).
84. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 94-99 (2003) (calling the Buchanan
administration’s analysis, which concluded that armed opposition to secession was unconstitutional,
“simply untenable—less defensible, even, then secessionism”).
85. Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural (Mar. 4, 1861). After arguing that the “union is perpetual,”
Lincoln continued on to say that:
acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are
insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances. I therefore consider that, in
view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability
I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the
Union be faithfully executed in all of the States.
Id.
86. Id. (“The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves
the aggressors. . . . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies.”).
87. FARBER, supra note 84, at 116.
88. A recalibration that was foreseen at least by Hamilton, who from the beginning argued that “the
energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security.” FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander
Hamilton).
89. Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Calling Forth the Militia) (Apr. 15, 1861). See also
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 348
(2005).
90. Id. This is the exact language of the 1795 Militia Act, which requires the President to call forth
the militia through such a proclamation. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 424, 424.
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July 4th.91 Following Lincoln’s proclamation, Simon Cameron—the Secretary of
War—sent out a telegram to the various state governors citing the Calling Forth Act
of 1795 as statutory authority and asking for specific troop requisitions from each
state.92
Lincoln’s initial response to the outbreak of the Civil War was, therefore, a
lawful exercise of congressionally-delegated constitutive powers. Although not
following the original legal order established by the Constitution, his actions did
follow the statutory national security precedents set by George Washington and the
1795 Congress after the Whiskey Rebellion.
A. Abraham Lincoln’s Blockade of the South
Only a few days after calling forth the militia, on April 19th, Lincoln took further
action and enacted a blockade on the southern ports ranging between South Carolina
and Texas.93 Shortly thereafter, he extended the blockade to encompass the ports of
North Carolina and Virginia. 94 At first, one might think this blockade posed no
difficult questions about the scope of presidential initiative. The authority to respond
defensively to a sudden attack is at the core of the president’s allotment of
constitutional war powers. Furthermore, the 1807 Insurrection Act had already
provided congressional authorization for the President to use “such part of the land
or naval force of the United states, as shall be judged necessary” to help put down
any insurrection that the militia had—pursuant to the 1795 Militia Act—been called
forth to suppress.95
But there was some difficulty. A blockade is an act of war: the type of military
action typically carried out only against a foreign state as part of a full war. Enacting
a blockade against the secessionist states as if they were a foreign enemy, therefore,
put pressure on Lincoln’s claim that the states remained in the Union and highlighted
that Congress had not declared a state of war with the South.96 The legal complexity
of the Civil War was already beginning to rear its head.
Nonetheless, the President’s blockade of the Confederate states was soon
approved by Congress and then upheld by the Supreme Court. The President’s
authority to use federal war powers in response to an attack on the United States—
even if lacking a congressional declaration of war 97 and facing a novel type of
adversary—was firmly incorporated into the constitutional order. The 37th
91. Lincoln, A Proclamation, supra note 89.
92. Simon Cameron, Telegram to State Governors (Apr. 15, 1861) (“I have the honor to request
[from your state] the quota designated in the table below, to serve as infantry or riflemen, for the period
of three months, unless sooner discharged.”).
93. WITT, supra note 83, at 145; FARBER, supra note 84, at 117.
94. WITT, supra note 83, at 145. The blockade was extended after Virginia and North Carolina, as
well as Tennessee and Arkansas, responded to the call for militiamen by seceding and joining the
Confederacy. See FARBER, supra note 84, at 117.
95. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
96. See WITT, supra note 83, at 144-49.
97. As discussed earlier, the Civil War was hardly the first conflict waged without a congressional
declaration of war. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Youngstown: Pages from the Book of Disquietude, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 3, 15 (2002) (“[The Quasi-war] was fought without benefit of a declaration of war, a
fact that should give some pause to those who think they have an unshakeable picture of the framers’
and ratifiers’ requirements on this matter.”).

290

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

Congress, during its special summer session, specifically authorized the President to
stop “all commercial intercourse” between secessionists and the Union; 98 further
authorized him to seize all goods, merchandise, and vessels coming or leaving the
Confederacy “by land or water;”99 and even authorized him to seize “any ship or
vessel belonging in whole or in part to any citizen or inhabitant of said [secessionist]
State[.]”100 All of these were to be enforced using any “suitable vessels” that the
President thought appropriate for the task. 101
Congress, rather than attempting to curtail the blockade, enthusiastically
endorsed Lincoln’s ability to take such a measure. Near the end of the summer,
Congress passed a further resolution that declared Lincoln’s pre-July actions
“respecting the army and navy of the United States . . . hereby approved and in all
respects legalized and made valid . . . as if they had been issued and done under the
previous express authority and direction of the United States.” 102 Again, we see the
process of constitutional calibration at work. Despite some tension between the new
threat facing the nation and the defensive options available to the political branches,
an assertive presidential response forcefully rebuffed the danger and was then
affirmed by Congress.
In this instance, however, Congress’s approval was likely superfluous as a
constitutional matter.103 Although Congress went out of its way to bolster Lincoln’s
authority to enact blockades going forward, Lincoln maintained that the blockade
was “strictly legal” from the start.104 And the Supreme Court, in The Prize Cases,105
agreed. The Court held that, as a general matter, the President was empowered—
even duty-bound—to respond when the nation was attacked by a “hostile party” and
thereby dragged into war.106 In this situation, the Court held that war had in fact
been forced upon the nation by the secessionist states. 107 Thus, Lincoln’s defensive
blockade was constitutional.108
Importantly, the Court avoided any too-clever paradoxes—such as holding that
98. Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5, 12 Stat. 255, 257.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 6.
101. Id. § 7.
102. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 255, 326.
103. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Presidential War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157
MIL. L. REV. 180, 215 (1998) (“Unlike the cases generated by the undeclared war with France, the
President derived the authority to issue the blockade orders exclusively from Article II.”). But it still
matters, of course, that Congress approved of Lincoln’s use of war powers. Congress’s many military
appropriations during the summer of 1861 were crucial to the war effort, and Congress might not have
been nearly so forthcoming if it had disapproved of Lincoln’s blockade. See generally Act of Aug. 6,
1861, ch. 63, 12 Stat. 255.
104. Abraham Lincoln, July 4th Message to Congress (1861).
105. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
106. Id. at 668 (“[The President] does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority . . . whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or
States organized in rebellion . . . .”). See also The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 702 (1871) (“[The]
executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to
act during the recess of Congress.”).
107. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 667 (“[The Civil War’s] actual existence is a fact in our
domestic history which the Court is bound to notice and to know.”).
108. Id. at 671 (“[T]he President had a right, jure belli, to institute a blockade of ports in possession
of the States in rebellion . . . .”).
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the conflict with the secessionists could not be treated as a war unless the United
States recognized the Confederate states as a sovereign nation—that would cripple
the Union effort and throw the Civil War into a legal grey zone with no clear laws
for the conflict at all.109 The Court squarely held that the conflict with the southern
states should be treated as a war for legal purposes even if the federal government
continued to deny that those states had independent sovereignty. 110 Lincoln was fully
vindicated by the Supreme Court. The federal government, with the executive
branch at the tip of the spear, could reject the possibility of secession and still use
the full gamut of war powers to defend itself. 111
President Lincoln’s aggressive decisions to call forth the militia and enact a
blockade on Confederate ports were lawful outgrowths of the Constitution’s vision
of an energetic, emergency-ready presidency and of early American adjustments that
reallocated additional powers to the President by statute. His next two steps,
however, reflected a more ambitious assumption of presidential authority to step into
the shoes of Congress and create additional, unfunded military forces.
First, on April 20th, Lincoln privately authorized a trio of expenditures with no
corresponding congressional appropriation: naval commanders were permitted to
purchase several steamships, the Secretary of War allowed New York state officials
to transport troops and munitions, and the Treasury Secretary advanced two million
dollars to private New York citizens to spend funds on necessary “military and naval
measures.”112 Then, on May 3rd, Lincoln publicly proclaimed that “existing
exigencies demand immediate and adequate measures for the protection of the
[Constitution and nation.]”113 He called for 42,000 additional three-year volunteers,
increased the army by more than 22,000 enlisted men and officers, and directed the
enlistment of 18,000 more men into the navy. 114 At the end of the proclamation,
Lincoln wrote that these military enlargements would be “submitted to Congress as
soon as assembled.”115 Both of Lincoln’s actions were boldly constitutive in nature,
stepping outside the typical frame of the presidential role. Yet they are not equal in
other important constitutional respects.
Crucially, President Lincoln did not disclose the April expenditures publicly
either at the moment when he authorized them or to Congress when the
representatives met for their special session in July. 116 It was not until early in the
109. Id. at 669-70 (“[Plaintiffs] cannot ask the Court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence
of a war . . . and thus cripple the arm of the Government and paralyze its power by subtle definitions and
ingenuous sophisms.”).
110. Id. at 666 (“A war may exist where one of the belligerents, claims sovereign rights as against
the other.”).
111. See also, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). In this, a case where the
Reconstruction government of Texas sought to enjoin defendants from cashing in bonds issued by the
rebel government, the Court held that Texas had never actually seceded because “[t]he Constitution, in
all of its provision, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” Id. at 725-26.
Therefore, Texas never became “foreign” and so the Civil War was a “a war for the suppression of
rebellion.” Id. at 726.
112. Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 1001-02.
113. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Increasing the Size of the Army and Navy) (May 3, 1861).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 1001-02.
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next year that Congress became fully aware of the expenditures and the secretive
cabinet deliberations that had preceded them.117 In April of 1862, Congress censured
the former Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, for, among other misdeeds, his role
in the expenditures.118 Lincoln wrote to Congress on Cameron’s behalf the next
month and defended the necessity of what had been done, but he did not argue that
it had been lawful: “I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that
crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the government was saved
from overthrow.”119
Given the circumstances, there is no avoiding the conclusion that Lincoln’s
April expenditures were unconstitutional usurpations of congressional power and,
rightfully, the type of presidential behavior that has not been adopted into the
national security order. The fundamental problem is less that the President briefly
infringed on a congressional prerogative and more so that he did it in a decidedly
undemocratic way. The decisions were made during private cabinet discussions and
then carried out through private channels that avoided congressional or public
review. The process of constitutional calibration cannot be activated if one political
branch works in secret to invade the core national security powers of the other—
here, Lincoln invading Congress’s appropriations power.
The President’s unconstitutional April expenditures can be safely contrasted
with his May army and navy increases. Although both acts were constitutive, the
latter was done through a public proclamation with Congress out of session, 120 and
Congress had an opportunity to respond soon afterwards. In this way, Lincoln was
acting as a temporary agent of Congress during a moment of crisis—taking up a
traditionally legislative power until Congress could ratify or reject his course of
action. Still, if Congress’s approval of the blockade had been more reassuring than
strictly necessary, its response here was a crucial determinant of what would happen
going forward. Congress took up the Lincoln line: it appropriated funds to pay
arrearages to the new members of the army, 121 navy,122 and others123 for their recent
service; funded those forces going forward; 124 and provided a blanket, retroactive
117. Id.
118. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1888 (1862). Congress voted 79-45 to censure Cameron
for giving a private citizen money to purchase arms “without restriction” and entering into “a vast
number of [illegitimate] contracts” on behalf of the government—conduct that was “highly injurious to
the public service[.]” Id. It is worth noting that even this censure was later rescinded. See CONG.
RECORD, 43rd Cong. 2d Sess. 2084 (1875) (rescinding the 1862 censure as “an act of personal justice to
Mr. Cameron, and as a correction of [the House’s] own records”).
119. CONG. GLOBE, 37th CONG., 2d Sess. 2383 (1862). Lincoln elaborated that he and his cabinet
had relied on private channels because they were concerned about the loyalty of public servants in
Washington D.C.
120. Consider the language that Lincoln used: “[These acts] will be submitted to Congress as soon
as assembled. In the meantime, I earnestly invoke the cooperation of all good citizens . . . .” Lincoln,
Proclamation, supra note 113. Lincoln’s words were the model of a collaborative response.
121. Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 2, 12 Stat. 255, 255 (for pay); Act of July 17, 1861, ch. 6, § 2, 12 Stat.
255, 264 (for other logistical expenses).
122. Act of July 18, 1861, ch. 8, § 2, 12 Stat. 255, 267 (for pay and other logistical expenses).
123. Act of July 27, 1861, ch. 23, 12 Stat. 255, 279 (for “the Police organized by the United States
for the City of Baltimore”).
124. Id. § 1 (for the navy); Act of July 16, 1861, ch. 6, § 1, 12 Stat. 255, 261-64 (for the army and
forts).
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validation of Lincoln’s actions “respecting the army and navy of the United
States.”125
An observer with a strict approach to separation of powers analysis might still
come to the conclusion that Lincoln acted unconstitutionally and then Congress gave
him a political pass. This Article argues otherwise. It was apparent that presidents
had limited constitutive powers in emergency circumstances ever since George
Washington put down the Whiskey Rebellion without the benefit of congressional
appropriations to do so.126 To call all presidential use of this temporary constitutive
power unconstitutional would flatten the meaningful distinctions that exist between,
as we have just seen, President Lincoln’s April and May actions. 127 The democratic
characteristics of those actions are a world apart, and the Constitution need not be
made so blind as to miss that fact.128 In April, Lincoln acted secretly and improperly
to displace Congress. In May, he acted publicly and temporarily in the stead of
Congress, and the body’s subsequent response allowed Lincoln’s wisely chosen
course to continue forward.129
B. Abraham Lincoln’s Suspension of Habeas Corpus
Finally, no discussion touching on national security, constitutional law, and the
Civil War can take place without considering President Lincoln’s suspension of
habeas corpus. In the spring of 1861, border states between the North and South
teetered on the edge of loyalty to the Union, as seen when Virginia, North Carolina,
and other states responded to Lincoln’s call for militiamen by themselves
seceding.130 After Virginia seceded, Washington D.C. was nearly surrounded by
Confederates. The capital was tenuously connected to the rest of the Union only

125. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 255, 326.
126. This power was also used by Thomas Jefferson during an episode this Article does not discuss,
the Chesapeake affair. See Rosen, supra note 52, at 105-07. But Rosen thinks of the power differently,
writing that “President [Jefferson] acted outside the Constitution, gambling that Congress would later
bless his actions.” Id. at 107.
127. But see FARBER, supra note 84, at 137 (“Lincoln’s diversion of appropriated funds does not
[pass constitutional muster]. Although not quite as clear a case, the same is probably true of his
expansion of the regular military.”).
128. It is unhelpful to interpret the respect that Washington, Jefferson, and, here, Lincoln showed
Congress while using temporary constitutive powers as proof that their actions were unconstitutional to
begin with. Taking seriously the importance of process to national security powers, it is in fact their
very public and scrupulous attention to legality that makes those presidents’ actions constitutional.
Their deference to Congress is also a sign of their wisdom; they realized Congress, with its firmer
constitutive powers, could undoubtedly reverse the course each had taken if it had wanted to.
129. Today, a presidential invocation of a constitutional appropriations power justified by
emergency would be much more suspect because Congress has already statutorily provided the
president with flexible and/or emergency funds in many circumstances. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. REP.
98-505, National Emergency Powers, at 3 (updated Mar. 23, 2020) (“There are various standby laws
that convey special emergency powers once the President [declares one.] In 1973, a Senate special
committee [identified] 470 provisions of federal law . . . . ”). Congressional authorization, once again,
can create limits.
130. FARBER, supra note 84, at 117.
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through the border state of Maryland. 131 And Maryland too was up against the sharp
edge of secession. Insurgent Marylander mobs attacked Union militiamen traveling
through the state and insurgent saboteurs cut train and telegraph lines. 132
In late April, with Congress still out of session, Lincoln ordered General
Winfield Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus as necessary “in the vicinity of
any military line . . . between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington.” 133
Pursuant to this authorization, military commanders in Maryland arrested and
detained John Merryman, a Baltimore farmer and alleged secessionist militiaman,
without bringing any charges against him. 134
Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a circuit judge in Maryland, attempted to take up
the case. His opinion in Ex parte Merryman castigated Lincoln and the military after
the commander of Fort McHenry—where Merryman was held—invoked the
suspension of habeas corpus and refused to appear in court to produce the prisoner
or justify his detention.135 Taney wrote that the Suspension Clause was a limit on
the legislative power to suspend habeas corpus that instructed Congress to use
“extreme caution” before suspending the writ, 136 and that the President could
absolutely not “in any emergency, or in any state of things, . . . authorize the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.” 137 Yet Taney made no formal order of
release for Merryman, instead sending copies of his opinion to Washington, D.C.
and lamenting that his judicial power was “resisted by a force too strong for me to
overcome.”138 Lincoln did not answer Taney directly, but he did take up the issue of
habeas corpus in his July 4th address to Congress on the first day of its special
session.
In his address, President Lincoln forcefully proclaimed that the suspension had
been lawful, and that, even if not, it had been a necessary, nation-preserving choice
in the face of constitutional conflict.139 Lincoln’s legal argument took a structural
and prudential approach to the Constitution, layering pragmatic considerations onto
the text. Given that habeas corpus could be suspended in “cases of rebellion or
invasion, [when] the public safety does require it,” and that there was such a case of
rebellion now, the remaining question was simply whether Congress or the President
was vested with the power to enact the suspension. 140
Lincoln answered that the provision “was plainly made for an emergency” and
that it would be illogical if suspension must wait “until Congress could be called
131. Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV.
481, 483 (2016) (“Even Washington . . . was threatened by Confederate armies, disloyal state militias …
irregular combatants . . . disloyal civilians, assassins, and spies.”).
132. Id. at 483-85.
133. Abraham Lincoln, Order to Suspend Habeas Corpus Between Philadelphia and Washington
(Apr. 27, 1861). This delegation was later extended, on July 2, to encompass New York to Washington.
See Abraham Lincoln, Order to Suspend Habeas Corpus Between New York and Washington (July 2,
1861).
134. Tillman, supra note 131, at 486-87, 493.
135. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147-148 (Cir. D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
136. Id. at 148.
137. Id. at 149.
138. Id. at 152.
139. Lincoln, July 4th Message to Congress, supra note 104.
140. Id.
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together” when the emergency might well prevent “the very assembling” of
Congress.141 Therefore, the President himself must have the provisional power to
suspend habeas corpus. In the alternative, Lincoln’s necessity argument cited the
Take Care Clause, which might force him to weigh allowing all of the federal laws
in the secessionist states to go unexecuted against violating the privilege of habeas
corpus “to a very limited extent.” 142 Lincoln further stated that the “official oath
[would] be broken” if a President allowed the government to be overthrown because
of rigid adherence to any “single law.” 143 His arguments thus made, he called for a
congressional response—inviting Congress into the process of constitutional
calibration.144
If one accepts—as I do—Lincoln’s primary argument that the President can
lawfully suspend habeas corpus during an emergency that prevents Congress from
doing so, then one should also expect this provisional authority to expire when
Congress convenes and is able to make a decision for itself. But what if Congress
convenes and makes no decision?
After its July 4th session began, Congress could have acted—right then in
1861—to either support or supplant Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. 145
Instead, Congress did neither. It was nearly two years later when Congress finally
chose to support the suspension with the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act. 146 The
intervening period between July 4, 1861 and March 3, 1863 was a breakdown in the
process of constitutional calibration and interbranch cooperation, and Congress’s
inaction caused a situation where Lincoln had little choice but to violate the
Constitution. This dovetails neatly with Lincoln’s secondary argument that the Oath
of Office and Take Care Clause might create a constitutional conflict between
enforcement of the many laws and strict respect for the one law. Lincoln thought
that it would be proper, if supra-constitutional, for the President to choose the many
laws in that instance.147
Given the arguments made in this Article, such a conflict is possible—but not
inevitable—in the Constitution, which is flexible enough to bring constitutional
legality to bear in an incredible range of extraordinary circumstances as long as the
political branches actually participate in the national security process envisioned by
the Constitution. The importance of constitutional calibration through active
interbranch participation is further emphasized by what happened when Congress
finally did act. Similar to many of the episodes previously discussed, eventual
congressional authorization of the suspension of habeas corpus enabled Congress to
141. Id. This argument for executive initiative aptly describes the actual situation, where Lincoln
acted to keep Maryland in the Union and preserve the nation’s capital.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (“[A]ny legislation upon the subject . . . is submitted entirely to the better judgment of
Congress.”).
145. See David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1136-40 (2006). Currie
writes about congressional deliberations during the 1861 summer session, noting that much of the
“heaviest artillery” lobbed by critics of Lincoln was directed at his suspension of habeas. Id. In the end,
Congress did not directly address habeas. Id.
146. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 255, 755.
147. The preamble supports this choice, and Art. II, § 4 provides the remedy—impeachment—if the
President is adjudged to be wrong. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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exert more control over subsequent presidential conduct. 148 In other words, the
President—and the nation—do not have the option to stand frozen on critical matters
of national security. Congress, therefore, must also actively exercise its robust war
powers in order to exert a sensible effect on policy and keep constitutional law afloat.
The Civil War and Reconstruction were the source of two great conceptual
revolutions in the inextricably intertwined fields of rights and security. One of these
revolutions is well-known in law schools and legal culture. It is the nationalist ethos
of the Reconstruction Amendments and the full realization that—even in our
federalist system—the most potent protector of human and civil rights is not the
states, but the federal government and the federal Constitution.149 The second
revolution is closely connected to the first, but of less profile. 150 It is the upheaval
of the Constitution’s national security order, an upheaval that underscored the
security-preserving and liberty-protecting role of a decisive President who will
bridge the gap between constitutive and directory powers when the situation
demands it.151 That is, as long as the President acts publicly, identifies reasonable
legal grounds for his action, and affords a willing Congress the opportunity to
respond by using its core powers to alter the nation’s course of conduct. This latter
legal revolution has not been as obviously affirmed in formal constitutional
amendments or the Supreme Court’s written decisions. But we should not forget that
first the Civil War was fought and won, and only then did we get the Thirteenth,
148. Section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1863, required the President to submit the names of federal
prisoners to the local courts. Furthermore, the executive branch was required to release prisoners if a
grand jury failed to return an indictment and the prisoner swore an oath of allegiance to the Union. See
ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 255, 755-56. See also supra text accompanying note 64 (discussing Little v.
Barreme).
149. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-83 (1995) (describing the Republican’s “freedom national, slavery
local” view of the Constitution); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 692 (2004) (“The War worked a fundamental transformation in
the legal status of slavery under the U.S. Constitution, and it defined (some would say redefined)
American federalism.”). This concept of federally-ensured liberty has been central to 20th and 21st
century American legal culture and rights movements. To the point that: “[I]nterference with national
government function shades off into the concept of interference with rights created and protected by the
national government. These concepts are bound together by the fact that the creation and protection of
individual rights is the highest function of any government.” CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25 (1969).
150. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 380. Amar writes about the broad
implications of the Reconstruction Amendments beyond their text. He describes “a new constitutional
narrative” that encompassed the notion that “[l]iberty would no longer be automatically associated with
localism” and recognized that the central government and federal army were the “heroes” of the war
effort. Id.
151. But see KOH, supra note 9, at 85 (“As activist as Lincoln’s wartime presidency was, it did not
amend the National Security Constitution. For Lincoln had not exercised his power in foreign affairs
against the insurrectionist southern states; instead, he had expansively employed his domestic statutory
and constitutional powers.”). Much of Koh’s work is excellent, but I disagree with him here. Koh
constructs a division between “foreign affairs” and “domestic statutory and constitutional powers” that
takes Lincoln’s precedents out of the realm of national security. Given what I have written about the
constitutional tenets of American national security strategy and law—and the complex nature of the
Civil War itself—I cannot agree that any such distinction is plausible. For example, as the blockade
against the secessionist states demonstrates, the methods of nation-state war and those of domestic
security were significantly blended during the Civil War.
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
V. THE POST-WAR 20TH CENTURY: AMERICA THE GLOBAL SUPERPOWER
Less than eighty years after the ratification of the Constitution, the Civil War
disrupted American geostrategy and showed the nation that there need not be a
menacing foreign foe for the United States to confront an existential threat at home.
Less than a hundred years after the Civil War, America emerged from World War II
as a global superpower with far-flung geostrategic interests and novel vulnerabilities
at home—a boisterous nation flush with new commitments and concerns. 152 In this
Part, I begin by discussing a set of three critical strategic and legal developments that
came about shortly after the close of World War II: (1) the growth of the U.S.
military, (2) the commencement of the Korean War, and (3) the Youngstown
decision. Then, I address how the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”)—an important
framework statute passed after the Vietnam War—fits into the constitutional process
of national security calibration.
The Vietnam War emphasized the extent to which Congress’s traditional
national security role had been diminished by earlier 20th century strategic
developments, and the WPR was the crowning statute of Congress’s effort to
reestablish the body’s energy and relevance. 153 This congressional enterprise,
however, should not be roundly applauded until it has been examined. Although
Congress’s abstract aims were commendable, the WPR is rife with issues. Overall,
this period of American national security highlighted the difficulty of finding
proactive, cooperative roles for the President and Congress, as well as the dangers of
failing to do so. In particular, the political branches struggled to deliver a coherent
two-step solution: (1) providing the executive branch with a flexible and potent array
of options to bring to bear against new strategic pressures while, (2) ensuring
assertive and impactful congressional participation in the lawful exercise of those
options.
A. Expansion of the U.S. Military
The first major development in the post-war
increase of the size, variety, and preparedness
following the close of World War II.154 The
professional military ready to be deployed at

20th century was the substantial
of the peacetime U.S. military
novel phenomenon of a large,
all times undermined the key

152. This intervening period of time included World War I, World War II, and a host of other
important wars, conflicts, and national security incidents as the United States grew from regional power
to global superpower. Still, for the level of granularity appropriate for this Article, the course of
constitutional national security can be charted without delving into events from 1865-1945.
153. See S. REP. NO. 91-129, at 7, 7-8 (1969) (“[T]he executive has acquired virtual supremacy over
the making as well as conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. The principle cause has been
[American involvement] in a series of crises which have revolutionized and are continuing to
revolutionize the world of the 20th century.”).
154. See, e.g., Robert L. Goldich, American Military Culture from Colony to Empire, 140
DAEDALUS 58, 61-62 (2011). And after World War II, just as millions of men flooded into the military
and stayed there, military leaders flooded out of the military into civil government and businesses. This
exchange further cemented the central role of the post-World War II military in politics and society. See
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 355-66 (1957).
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constitutive valve Congress had historically used to maintain preclusive control over
military action: the decision whether to create military forces at all. 155 Presidents
after World War II had a vast array of credible military options to command at any
given time without, as a practical matter, needing overt congressional approval for
the particular mission.156
In addition, Congress, through the National Security Act of 1947, exercised its
legislative powers to restructure America’s national security apparatus so that it
would be subject to “authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian
control.”157 Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency, the Air Force, and
the National Security Council, and it brought the nation’s now-expansive military
and intelligence infrastructure squarely under the centralized control of the executive
branch.158 Following the passage of the 1947 Act, presidents could not only deploy
the military widely but could also initiate a range of covert and tactical operations to
vindicate specific national interests.
Congress—responding to the military lessons of World War II and recognizing
its duty to ratify complementary legal frameworks 159—had purposefully provided
these capabilities to the executive branch to ensure that laws would not be so
“restrictive and inflexible” that they would thwart the strategic and political aims of
the nation.160 On the other hand, however, opponents of the 1947 Act immediately
decried the measures as an abdication of Congress’s constitutional role. 161 Finally,
in addition to traditional or covert armed forces, the invention of nuclear weapons
further contributed to the need for and provision of greater presidential control—

155. For instance, as discussed earlier, the main source of congressional opposition to John Adams
during the Quasi-War with France had been concern that expansion of the navy would undermine
Congress’s functional control over military actions. See BARRON, supra note 5, at 43 (“[The lack of a
standing military] ensured that Congress retained de facto control over the commander in chief. With
no standing forces to command, the president had no choice but to seek permission to conduct any
particular military operation, big or small, that he might favor.”).
156. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 74 (“[I]n many circumstances, the president’s decision whether or
not to go to war in the first place as well as her decision about what sort of war to prosecute are made in
light of the military she has. And, of course, what kind of military she has is a function of the sort of
military Congress chooses to fund.”).
157. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 2, 61 Stat. 495, 496.
158. Id. §§ 101(a), 102(a), 207(a); see also KOH, supra note 9, at 101-04 (“[T]he National Security
Act of 1947 formalized the principle of accountable, centralized presidential management of the external
acts of [military and intelligence] officials.”).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 2 (1947) (“The experiences of the war just concluded have proven
conclusively that we must maintain in time of peace an adequate organization of the national defense
readily adapted to the needs of war on short notice. . . . Since we are a people governed by laws and not
by men… One of the purposes of the bill is to give statutory effect to certain organizational features
developed during the war and which have proven to be desirable. . . .”).
160. Id.
161. The chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Clare E.
Hoffman, appended his contrasting views to the Committee Report. Hoffman wrote that:
[T]he proposed legislation does not conform to the procedure for the national defense as
outlined in the Constitution. . . . It is no answer to say these new agencies . . . must come
[to Congress] to implement their plans. . . . It is a matter of common knowledge that all too
often the Congress and the Nation are whipped into line, compelled to support plans and
policies promulgated [by the executive branch] . . . .
Id. at 7.
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especially as the logic of nuclear deterrence matured. 162 The rise of the executive
branch in the atomic age was a conscious, cooperative reaction to new strategic
demands and to the softening distinction between times of war and peace.163
B. The Korean War
America’s new balance of war powers was soon elaborated upon by Harry
Truman. In the spring of 1950, the Truman administration produced a strategic
planning document, NSC 68, to govern the nation’s Cold War efforts. 164 The plan
called for a “concerted build up” of the nation’s economic, political, and particularly
military strength so that the “moral and material strength of the free world” could be
projected into the “Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change
in the Soviet system.”165 War—certainly, offensive war—was not the aim of this
plan, but NSC 68 emphasized that America had to treat “the cold war [as] in fact a
real war” and remain prepared to make remarkable investments to defend its vital
interests whenever necessary.166 At first, it was no certainty that Truman would
adopt the conclusions of the report, but any doubt on the matter was resolved when
North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel just weeks later.167 North Korean troops struck
a surprise blow against its southern neighbor in late June of 1950, and the President
rapidly deployed troops to defend South Korea without obtaining specific
congressional authority.168
The State Department, in a brief memorandum written on July 3, 1950, delivered
the legal rationale of the Truman administration. 169 In particular, the memo argued
that North Korea’s defiance of a pair of Article 39 U.N. Security Council resolutions
posed a threat to the “peace and security of the United States.”170 This threat created
a national interest which the President, as Commander in Chief, could lawfully act
to protect.171 An earlier statute that had limited the President’s domestic authority to
deploy U.S troops pursuant to U.N. authorization was not triggered because that
statute pertained only to military support obliged by a “special agreement” with the

162. See Act of Aug. 4, 1946, ch. 724, § 6, 60 Stat. 755, 763 (“The President from time to time may
direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed
forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense . . . ”).
163. See Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L. J. 1626, 1685 (2014)
(“[The Cold War strategy] of deterrent and coercive force . . . rested on a foundation of executivecongressional collaboration and dialogue that played out over decades.”).
164. See generally NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NSC-68: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY (1950).
165. Id. at 64.
166. Id. at 65.
167. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 772-75 (1992).
168. BARRON, supra note 5, at 296.
169. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEP’T ST. BULL., PUB. NO. 3926 AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
REPEL THE ATTACK IN KOREA 173, 173 (1950).
170. Id. at 177. North Korean defiance first posed a threat to the U.N.’s effectiveness, and through
that to “international peace and security,” and through that to the United States. Id. at 176-77.
171. Id. at 177-78 (arguing that the President’s deployment of troops was “within his authority as
Commander in Chief” and providing 85 past examples of when the United States “used its land and
naval forces in foreign territories during peacetime”).
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U.N., and the deployment here was a voluntary decision by Truman. 172 Although
the President lacked express congressional authorization, Congress was kept abreast
of Truman’s intentions from the start and the war had many legislative supporters.173
The lack of any official authorization was, to a great extent, a result of international
politics and Truman’s desire to avoid the appearance of a potential World War III
coming so hot on the heels of World War II.174 And, even more to the point,
Congress overwhelmingly voted to provide appropriations for the war and renewed
selective service laws so that the draft would continue to support the war effort. 175
Nonetheless, Congress had a relatively hands-off approach to the Korean War
compared to previous conflicts of similar scale—especially with regard to initiation
of the conflict.
The Korean War is yet another event supporting the proposition that major
armed conflicts do not necessarily require a declaration of war, which at this point
should not come as particularly surprising or troubling. 176 The war does, however,
point to the opening of a more troublesome gulf—in time and of purpose—between
the legal acts of the President and Congress. Both branches, relying on Congress’s
substantial constitutive actions in the years prior to the Korean War, were willing to
let the war effort itself rest on vigorous presidential initiative with only minimal
contemporaneous congressional input.
The war’s lack of active constitutional process, therefore, cannot be attributed
to a spontaneously generated imperial presidency. Although Truman contributed to
an emerging shift in war powers process, his contributions were neither unprompted
nor unilateral.177 The infirmity of deliberative interbranch activity during the Korean
War had significant strategic and structural causes, and so any remedy would need
to be something more creative and practical than an undifferentiated call for greater
external constraints on the President.
C. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
The Supreme Court did not have to grapple directly with any constitutional
questions about the initiation of the Korean War, but in 1952 the Court was tasked
172. See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology
Matters, 106 YALE L. J. 845, 868-69 n.125 (1996).
173. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 1059 (“When Truman made his unilateral moves in
Korea in 1950, there was little opposition in Congress because the legislature largely favored what he
had done.”); MCCULLOUGH, supra note 167, at 781 (“In the Senate, Republican William Knowland
called for ‘overwhelming support’ for the President from all Americans regardless of party.”).
174. See BARRON, supra note 5, at 298.
175. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 n.43 (2005); MCCULLOUGH, supra note 167, at 781 (“By a
vote of 315 to 4, the House promptly voted a one-year extension of the draft law.”).
176. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 175, at 2050 (“[M]ost uses of military force in U.S. history,
including significant military engagements such as the Korean War and the Kosovo bombing campaign,
have been initiated without express congressional authorization.”).
177. After all, Congress’s defense spending spree continued, with defense spending growing from
~2% of GDP in the years prior to World War II, to ~ 8% of GDP in the early post-war Truman
administration, and then to nearly 15% by the end of the Truman administration. Defense Spending
Charts, U.S. GOV’T SPENDING, https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defense_spending_analysis
[https://perma.cc/ES4W-UVKM] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
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with deciding an important domestic case that implicated the wartime division of
political branch powers. That case, of course, is now the favorite child of many a
constitutional or national security law casebook: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.178
Youngstown, often called the “Steel Seizure Case,” concerned President
Truman’s seizure of steel mills to keep them running after long-simmering labor
disputes boiled over into a national strike during the Korean War.179 Truman acted
through an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to take over the
steel mills, but he twice wrote to Congress asking for it to affirm or reject his
action.180 Congress made no response. 181 In the end, the Supreme Court held 6-3
for the mill owners against the President, with each Justice in the majority writing
his own opinion.
The many opinions in Youngstown exhibit a range of constitutional
methodologies.182 Of these, Justice Robert Jackson’s sophisticated structural
approach to analyzing the constitutional validity of presidential action has garnered
the most attention. Jackson’s description of the extent of executive power is a
nuanced and outstanding piece of constitutional analysis, and this Article often
follows—at least attempts to follow—in the footsteps of Justice Jackson. 183
Although Jackson’s Youngstown framework is typically described as
tripartite,184 the framework actually depends on two distinct, substantive questions,
each with three possible answers. First, has Congress authorized, remained neutral
toward, or denied the President’s action? Second, is the President’s action supported
by an exclusively executive, an overlapping, or a legislative power? Thus, nine
possible results arise out of the Jackson framework. Many of these results provide
conclusive answers to the constitutional question, while a few invite further—and
particularly difficult—analysis.

178. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
179. Id. at 584.
180. AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND
FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 21 (Lexington Books, 2010).
181. Id.
182. See generally Bobbitt, Youngstown, supra note 97 (discussing the rich, modal qualities of the
various Youngstown opinions).
183. Of course, this Article is primarily concerned with political branch perspectives on the
separation of powers, while Justice Jackson obviously takes a judicial perspective.
184. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 9, at 108-10 (noting Jackson’s “three-tiered hierarchy . . . now so
familiar to first-year law students[,]” Jackson’s “three-part schema[,]” and Jackson’s “tripartite
analysis”).
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T-1. The Matrix Account of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Framework
Congress
Denies
Authorization

Congress
Remains Neutral

Congress Provides
Authorization

President Has
Exclusive,
Independent Power

Congress’s
statute is
unconstitutional.

The President’s act
is constitutional.

There is no issue.

President and
Congress Have
Overlapping or
Uncertain Powers

The President is
at the “lowest
ebb” and the act
merits skeptical
judicial review.

The President is in
the “zone of
twilight” and the
act merits factintensive review.

There is no issue,
and Congress’s
authorization may
impose limits.

President Does Not
Possess
Independent Power

The President’s
act is
unconstitutional.

The President’s act
is likely
unconstitutional.185

There is no issue as
long as Congress has
the necessary power.

There are several important consequences of viewing Jackson’s framework as a
nine-cell matrix rather than a three-category schema. First, we see that separation of
powers analysis branches out according to multiple initial inputs, and it will proceed
on to more difficult constitutional questions only as the straightforward possibilities
for resolution disappear.
Second, we observe that the most demanding form of constitutional analysis is
typically required only where powers overlap and Congress has either remained
neutral toward or rejected the President’s action. It is in these instances that
interbranch constitutional process is either still ongoing or has broken down. Neither
text,186 nor history,187 have conclusively settled the issue. Constitutional structure,188

185. Justice Jackson, in a footnote, notes Lincoln’s suspension of habeas as an instance where the
President made a contested claim to provisional powers in the face of judicial resistance and then
received after-the-fact congressional approval. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 n.3 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). But Jackson is cautious here, and his later arguments
suggest he does not agree with the argument I have defended—see supra text accompanying notes 120–
29 and 139–47—that the President may constitutionally exercise legislative power for a limited time
during emergencies where congressional authorization is precluded.
186. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under our Constitution does
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”).
187. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as
the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”).
188. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[The Constitution] enjoins upon its branches separateness
but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by… [the
Justice Jackson framework.]”) (emphasis added).
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therefore, drives the Court toward additional prudential, 189 precedential,190 and
ethical considerations,191 and their merits then guide the analysis forward to its
conclusion. We can distinguish between “lowest ebb” and “zone of twilight”
analysis by noting that a presumption against the President’s arguments applies in
the former instance,192 whereas prudential considerations—likely favoring the
President—dominate the latter.193
Third, we are reminded that this analytical framework for judicial review is only
that. Jackson’s concurrence describes a judicial methodology for sorting and
evaluating the actions of the political branches that, even as an after-the-fact exercise,
does not necessarily lead to conclusive constitutional answers by itself. Jackson did
not provide any sort of predetermined roadmap for executive-congressional relations
and specifically admonished Congress with Napoleon’s maxim that “[t]he tools
belong to the man who can use them.” 194
But Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, which is an exemplar of thoughtful
judicial analysis, has often been mistaken for a guide to legislative action. The
mistaken takeaways from the Korean War—if viewed as an episode of sua sponte
presidential aggrandizement with no underlying congressional or strategic causes—
and Youngstown—if viewed as a prescription for Congress to register expressive
judgments on presidential action in anticipation of future judicial input—together led
to a fundamental and problematic shift in how congressional war powers were
viewed.195 The constitutive role of Congress was minimized, and the specificity and
rigor of its ex ante decision-making about national security issues was similarly
diminished.196 Instead, Congress began to act as a department that intermittently
weighed in on the propriety of actions taken by the executive branch after the dust
189. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[I] give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity
afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a
doctrinaire textualism.”).
190. Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that
reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the
centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.”).
191. Id. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“That military powers of the Commander in Chief were not
to supersede representative government of internal affairs seems obvious from the Constitution and from
elementary American history.”).
192. Id. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution.”).
193. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”).
194. Id. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
195. A further mistake made with Youngstown is to interpret it as a case applying as forcefully to
foreign affairs as it does to internal affairs. Justice Jackson repeatedly emphasized the fact that
Youngstown was about control over internal affairs. Specifically, he noted that the Court:
[S]hould indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the Commander in Chief’s]
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned
against the outside world for the security of our society. But, when it is turned inward, not
because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor,
it should have no such indulgence.
Id. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring).
196. Waxman, supra note 163 at 1626 (“At least by the Cold War, however, Presidents began
exercising this power [to engage in hostilities] unilaterally in a much wider set of cases, and Congress
mostly allowed them to do so.”).
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had settled.197 Thus, as the nation emerged from the deeply divisive experiences of
the Vietnam War and Nixon presidency just a few short decades after Youngstown,
Congress passed an infamous statute that sought to reassert the legislature’s national
security relevance by carving out an improper, quasi-judicial role for itself.198
D. The War Powers Resolution
In the waning months of 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over
President Nixon’s emphatic veto.199 The country was in the final stages of extricating
itself from the Vietnam War, a conflict that had been extremely unpopular but
consistently supported by congressional appropriations and authorizations. 200
Although the war eventually wound down in part due to congressional funding
cutbacks,201 the legislature nonetheless emerged from the experience feeling that its
existing institutional tools were insufficient. 202 At first, the Senate and House were
unable to find an approach to war powers reform that satisfied both bodies, and
several bills preceding the WPR floundered and failed.203 The WPR Congress
clashed over whether to adopt a bright-line, definitional approach—as the Senate
preferred—or a procedural approach—as the House preferred.204
In the end, the House approach won out. 205 Nixon vetoed the resolution,
criticizing the passive nature of its procedure for congressional termination of U.S.
involvement in hostilities.206 Although some members of Congress accepted the
President’s concerns,207 the bulk of the membership felt the WPR provided a healthy

197. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1379, 1379-80 (1988) (writing of congressional self-perception in the 1970s that, since 1950, “it had lain
back, neither approving presidential military ventures nor very explicitly approving them, trusting the
President to take the lead and waiting to see how the war in question played politically”).
198. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional,
Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud that Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 109, 116-19 (2012).
199. Ely, supra note 197, at 1379.
200. Id. at 1391 (noting that the Vietnam War “had been congressionally authorized—albeit not in
the most responsibly way. . . .”).
201. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis
of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 485-88 (2011).
202. See Ely, supra note 197, at 1380 (“[T]he War Powers Resolution is designed to force a decision
regarding matters that Congress has in the past shown itself unwilling to face up to.”).
203. See Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, 113
POL. SCI. Q. 1, 2-3 (1998) (“In drafting the War Powers Resolution, the House and the Senate began
with incompatible principles.”).
204. See id. at 2; see also 119 CONG. REC. 24,655 (July 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. David Dennis)
(“[W]hile ordinarily the President must have prior authorization to commit troops to combat abroad, I
recognize that emergency situations may arise where that is not possible. I do not attempt, as the Javits
bill does in the [Senate], to define what those emergency situations may be. . . .”).
205. Ely, supra note 197, at 1393.
206. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-171, at 2 (1973) (“I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the
President’s constitutional powers . . . would terminate automatically . . . . [T]he Congress is here
attempting to increase its policy-making role through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no
action at all.”).
207. 119 CONG. REC. 36,204 (Nov. 7, 1973) (statement of Rep. Gerald R. Ford) (“We cannot deny
that this bill does not really fashion a partnership. It makes us, the Congress, a partner by inaction. If
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mix of flexibility for the President and ongoing oversight for Congress. 208
Congress correctly chose to focus on interbranch procedure in the WPR rather
than detailing necessary and sufficient conditions for presidential action, but
Congress nonetheless misconstrued its role in the constitutional process of national
security. The WPR is a brisk, ten section resolution that confidently states its
purpose “to fill the intent of the framers of the Constitution.”209 Yet the resolution’s
brevity papers over hundreds of years of constitutional debates, and the selfconscious result attempts to recast Congress as an expressive, adjudicative body. 210
Section 2(c)—the clearest vestige of the Senate’s definitional approach—sets out a
purportedly exhaustive description of the President’s Commander in Chief power 211
that fails to account for widely accepted uses.212 Section 3—on consultation between
the President and Congress—is, although a laudable statutory goal, woefully
underspecified and cannot be viewed as a serious attempt to increase interbranch
deliberation despite the vague call for consultation “in every possible instance.” 213
Sections 4 and 5—the heart of the WPR—outline reporting requirements and
specify procedures for the termination of U.S. involvement in hostilities. Section 4
requires the President to report to Congress within forty-eight hours when U.S.
armed forces are introduced into a variety of circumstances. 214 Then, Section 5(b)—
if reporting was made pursuant to Section 4(a)(1)—requires the President to
withdraw armed forces from hostilities after sixty to ninety days unless Congress has
specifically authorized the engagement.215 Meanwhile, Section 5(c) develops a
concurrent resolution procedure for Congress to require the removal of U.S. forces
at any time.216 Sections 6 and 7 create priority parliamentary procedures for
resolutions arising out of the WPR.217 Finally, Section 8 states several rules of
the Congress wants to assume a role that is essential for that partnership, we have to redesign this
legislation.”).
208. 119 CONG. REC. 36,205 (Nov. 7, 1973) (statement of Rep. James Martin) (“[The WPR] allows
quick, unencumbered Presidential response to crisis situations, but mandates congressional concurrence
within a reasonable period of time.”).
209. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1541(a)).
210. Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President under the War Powers
Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 85 (1984) (describing the WPR as “a procedure by which Congress
can express its institutional judgment on [presidential action]”).
211. § 2(c), 87 Stat. at 555 (“[The President’s Commander in Chief powers] are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”).
212. See UNIV. OF VA. MILLER CTR OF PUB. AFFS., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT
21 (2008) (“[E]ven ardent advocates of congressional power recognize that Section 2(c) of the
Resolution too narrowly defines the President’s war powers . . . .”).
213. § 3, 87 Stat. at 555. Despite the vague and minimal text in § 3 of the WPR, it has been
relatively effective. See Ely, supra note 197, at 1400-01. I would argue that this is because § 3—almost
uniquely in the WPR—correctly understands Congress’s proper role.
214. § 4(a), 87 Stat. at 555-56.
215. Id. § 5(b), 87 Stat. at 556 (extending the withdrawal clock from 60 to 90 days “if the President
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the
safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces”).
216. Id. § 5(c), 87 Stat. at 556-57 (“[F]orces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so
directs by concurrent resolution.”).
217. Id. §§ 6, 7, 87 Stat. at 557-58.
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interpretation for the statute, including a bar against inferring congressional
authorization from implied sources—such as appropriations.218
The WPR has been consistently panned as an unconstitutional infringement on
the President’s war powers. First, Section 2(c) does not recognize the President’s
authority to protect American people or property abroad, and it is separated by a vast
chasm from the theory of presidential power embraced by modern presidents, which
extends to “important national interest[s] protected by means short of war.” 219
Second, the automatic withdrawal provision in Section 5(b) has been consistently
contested by presidential administrations, and presidents almost never report under
Section 4(a)(1), which is the only section that triggers 5(b) automatic withdrawal. 220
Third, the concurrent resolution provision in Section 5(c) is likely an unconstitutional
legislative veto after INS v. Chadha.221 Fourth, the restriction against inferring
authorization for the President from congressional appropriations is an undemocratic
limit on the lawmaking options available to future Congresses. 222 Even those more
sympathetic to the style of the WPR have criticized the resolution for being overfitted
to the political climate of the early 1970s,223 failing to foresee technological and
strategic change,224 and relying on ambiguous language at key points. 225
But the fundamental failure of the WPR is that Congress abandoned its
constitutive national security powers. Instead, Congress’s WPR reimagines the
Declare War power as an on-off switch—or at least a dimmer switch—that can be
subtly manipulated through restrictive canons of interpretation, automatic
withdrawal clocks, and congressional statements lacking the force of law. This view
of Congress’s role is blind to history, the constitutional process of national security,
218. Id. § 8(a)(1), 87 Stat. at 558 (“[Authorization is not to be inferred from] any provision
contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes . . . .”).
219. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 20 27-33 (2011).
220. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42699, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice 6 (2019)
(“Every President . . . has taken the position that [the WPR] is an unconstitutional infringement on the
President’s authority as Commander in Chief.”); id. at 10 (“The report on the Mayaguez recapture was
the only War Powers report to date to specifically cite Section 4(a)(1), but the question of the time limit
was moot because the action was over by the time the report was filed.”).
221. Id. at 7-8 (noting the passage of 50 U.S.C. § 1546a – a “free standing” post-Chadha revision to
the WPR process that “fill[s] the gap left by the possible invalidity of the concurrent resolution
mechanism”). See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
222. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 341 (2000) (recounting
the long history of congressional appropriations operating as authorization and adopting and crediting
Philip Bobbitt’s argument that “if one Congress could bind subsequent Congresses in this way, it would
effectively enshrine itself in defiance of [an] electoral mandate” (quoting Bobbitt, War Powers, supra
note 39, at 1399)).
223. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 17, 18-21 (1995) (“The Resolution emerged from an aberrational political climate in 1973, and
that climate was wrongly assumed to represent a sea-change in congressional-executive relations that
would exist for years to come.”).
224. See, e.g., Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 201, at 449 (“[T]he War Powers Resolution,
passed in the wake of Vietnam, continues to suppose that wars come in only two sizes . . . [and it] failed
to acknowledge that modem war is limited war.”). This reflects the weakness of any overfitted view of
national security and the separation of powers, whether that view is embedded in constitutional or
statutory text. War changes, and so too must law.
225. See, e.g., Vance, supra note 210, at 91-94 (proposing amendments to shore up the WPR’s loose
statutory language).
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and contemporary strategic pressures. Predictably, the WPR has failed to lead to
meaningful congressional involvement or more cooperative and open presidential
decision-making. The WPR, and the other 20th century events discussed, do not tell
us that Congress must transform itself in order to fight back against a runaway
presidency that has trampled Congress and seized unmerited and unconstitutional
power. Instead, the experience of the 20th century shows us that developments in
the nation’s geostrategy and national interests require the political branches to renew
their mutual investment in affirmative, deliberative modes of collaboration on
national security issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
This path through centuries of constitutional history is one of many routes
through the thicket. Although I hope that my commitment to methodology has led
me true, I am sure that a summary of my conclusions about the Constitution’s
approach to national security will help the reader correct me if—where—I have gone
astray. So, the Constitution provides a rough silhouette of the relationship between
legislative and executive national security powers, but it leaves the detail to be filled
in by ongoing interbranch process.226 Detail was left unfinished not because the
Founders lacked strategic insight—the Constitution was confidently endowed with a
particular geostrategy well-suited for its day—but because they had the foresight to
realize the nation’s legal order required sufficient flexibility to address future
strategic developments.
Therefore, while core textual powers structure and limit the flow of
constitutional process, text alone cannot fully categorize the set of applicable rules
or allow one to predict the constitutional calibrations that will occur in a given
situation. Bearing this in mind, the value gained from carefully analyzing past
experience and practice is substantial. 227 The precedents of history are loaded with
elaborations—at once legal and strategic—that shed light on the fundamental rules
governing the constitutional process of national security calibration. 228
At bedrock, we are consistently reminded that this constitutional process is how
America keeps law alive in those stressful circumstances where the nation is
threatened and democracy flickers. In these moments, we must defend either a
constitutional system that allows for boundary-pushing theories of executive power
226. The existence of the process itself derives from: (1) text, the actual language that vests powers
with Congress and the President, (2) history, the Founders’ deep concern for well-calibrated geostrategy
and national security policy, and (3) structure, the at times open-ended and at times overlapping nature
of legislative and executive prerogatives.
227. See generally NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). Five members of the court, citing
Justice Marshall in McCulloch and Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, emphasized that practice was an
important interpretative factor for settling questions about “the allocation of power between two elected
branches of Government” even if the practice was “subject to dispute” and “began after the founding
era.” Id. at 524-26. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment with the last three Justices, agreed only if
the Court was dealing with “an ambiguous constitutional provision” and the practice was “open,
widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.” Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
228. The rules of the process—bounded first by text, history, and structure—accrue additional detail
from: (1) prudence, the efficiency and necessity of various templates for executive action, (2) ethos, the
conscious renewal of the Founders’ pairing of law and strategy, and (3) doctrine, the sedimentation of
political branch practice, at times informed by judicial review.
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that afford Congress an opportunity to later respond, 229 or a constitutional system
that demands illegal executive action that may or may not be ratified ex post by
Congress.230
There is reason to be cautious about the precedent set by either, but I firmly
support the former. The Constitution, and the nation, are better served by presidents
who feel compelled to make careful constitutional arguments while wary of
congressional rebuttal than they are by presidents who violate the law in the hopes
of later finding 218 + 51 votes to ratify the action. We should, therefore, not attempt
to invent a frozen analysis of war powers or a rigid separation of powers “settled” by
falsely determinative constitutional text and history.231 This rigidity would demand,
and therefore normalize, presidential action that ignores so-called constitutional
mandates. In contrast, the principled evolution of our Constitution to match the
developments of the world is a triumph—not a defeat—of the rule of law.
On a closely related note, we repeatedly see that the process requires cooperative
action to function properly—a rule that is both implied by the Constitution and
impossible to miss in practice. Thus, cooperation between the political branches is
not just a description of past experience—it is a normative dictate that every
participant must respect today. This foundational rule takes on a more specific form
for each branch. The President must always operate pursuant to open and honest
policies even if, from time to time, he must act unilaterally or in secret.232 Congress
must act with conviction even if it could stand back instead, and the body must
respect that it is a participant in—not an adjudicator of—national security decisionmaking.233 And, finally, the courts must establish incentives for good political
branch behavior rather than abstain from judgment or endorse doctrines that might
stunt cooperation in the future.234 It is these basic prescriptions that preserve and
229. See supra notes 120–29 and 139–47 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 35, at 87 (“In a genuine emergency,
a President may act without congressional authority (and without express legal or constitutional
authority), trusting that the circumstances are so urgent and compelling that Congress will endorse his
actions and confer a legitimacy that only Congress, as the people’s representative, can provide.”).
231. Contra Fisher & Adler, supra note 203, at 9 (“The meaning of the war clause was thus settled
at the dawn of the republic. . . . The Constitution grants to Congress the sum total of the nation’s power
to commence hostilities. There was in the Convention no doubt about the limited scope of the
president’s war power.”).
232. See Philip Bobbitt, Inter Arma Enim Non Silent Legis, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 253, 260-61
(2012) (“The rule of law is the civilian’s best bulwark not only against his own government but against
those who would hold him hostage to their political objectives by threatening him with violence. . . .
This feature of contemporary warfare imposes on governments a necessity to make the legal arguments
for their operations.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made
by parliamentary deliberations.”).
233. See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 201, at 495-96 (“We have come a long way from the
Founding Era, when the president was obliged to gain fine-grained funding from Congress before he
could engage in significant military action. Nowadays, Congress is playing catch-up.”); Youngstown,
359 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep
power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A crisis that
challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress.”).
234. See KOH, supra note 9, at 184 (“[T]he role of judges is to define the rule of law by drawing the
line between illegitimate exercises of political power and legitimate exercises of legal authority.”);
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renew the vitality of the Constitution.
Yet, one wonders if these rules—and this process—will continue to be enough.
As America has ventured out from the safe harbor of its original national security
paradigm, it has become increasingly difficult to generate presidential and
congressional roles that map sensibly onto modern security aims. In today’s world,
the combined complexity, scale, and stakes of national security threaten to
overwhelm the ordered discipline of constitutional law. There are many causes of
this strategic upheaval, but several stand out.
First, civilians can be targeted at scale in a multitude of different ways. 235
Second, destructive—even catastrophic—power is widely distributed among states,
non-state organizations, and even individuals.236 Third, it is increasingly difficult to
confidently determine the perpetrator of an attack, whether that attack be cyber,
biological, or otherwise.237 Fourth, the world is interconnected to such a degree that
traditional geographic barriers are essentially porous or irrelevant.238 We now travel
the cliffside path, balancing our need to prevent civilian carnage with our need for
open democratic governance.239 At our heels come the dogs of war, of pandemic, of
disabled power grids, of nuclear weaponry in a suitcase. Below us lays the plunge
into lawlessness, into total surveillance, into suspicion, into the siren that never
ceases to screech.
The constitutional process—for all its flexibility and enduring vitality—was
designed to work best on an intermediate time horizon, where the political branches
had an opportunity to jointly consider constitutive and directory responses to a
particular threat. But, given the nature of modern vulnerabilities and the need for
preclusive government action, the timing of national security interventions has
necessarily morphed into a bimodal distribution.
At one end, Congress’s constitutive powers must be exercised well in advance

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Such institutions [of rule by parliamentary law]
may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”).
235. GLOBAL TRENDS: PARADOX OF PROGRESS, NAT’L INTEL. COUNCIL 20 (Jan. 2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9M4-62RQ ] (“Future
conflicts will increasingly emphasize the disruption of critical infrastructure, societal cohesion, and
basic government functions . . . Noncombatants will be increasingly targeted.”).
236. Id. at 20-21 (“The threat posed by nuclear and other forms of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) probably will increase in the years ahead due to technology advances and growing asymmetry
between forces. . . . The proliferation of advanced technologies, especially biotechnologies, will also
lower the threshold for new actors to acquire WMD capabilities.”).
237. Id. at 216 (“[N]ew means for conducting conflicts and sowing instability . . . will often
obfuscate the source of attacks impeding effective responses.”).
238. Id. at 25 (“Increasing global connectivity and changing environmental conditions will affect the
geographic distribution of pathogens and their hosts, and, in turn, the emergence, transmission, and
spread of many human and animal infectious diseases.”); LUCAS KELLO, THE VIRTUAL WEAPON & THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 6 (2017) (“States and other actors use cyberspace to penetrate each other’s
most basic infrastructures. . . . [I]n the past, the enemy’s presence in essential domestic terrains signaled
the failure of security policy; today it is a starting axiom.”).
239. See BOBBITT, TERROR & CONSENT, supra note 3, at 137-38 (“One way to articulate this change
is to say that developments have increased the role of preclusion in warfare. . . . The war aim is to
protect civilians and their officials so that, behind this military shield, the political development of
governance based on consent can take place . . . .”).
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of any particular threat arising—there is no time to wait. 240 At the other end, the
President’s directory powers must be exercised at the drop of a hat, springing into
action without studied and open deliberation—there is no time to wait.241 This
temporal and epistemic divergence in political branch action is a significant
development, and it poses a substantial challenge to our constitutional order. Even
worse, while the Founders were uniquely talented constitutional architects, we must
admit that our modern leaders are often something less than that.
But rather than closing on a defeatist note, I will offer some suggestions
grounded in the lessons of past practice for how the constitutional process might yet
rise to the challenge of today’s national security landscape. Most importantly, the
fundamental ground rules previously discussed—of honest, collaborative, and
strategy-sensitive deliberation between the political branches—must be followed.
Beyond that, the various government departments must undertake a serious effort to
reach out across the gap created by the now disparate timing of their core national
security interventions.
The President, and the President’s vast assembly of lawyers, should create and
publish proactive guidance on how the executive branch will use particular
capabilities and respond to different emergency archetypes.242 Some of this work
would be fit for mass publication, some of it would be classified and provided to
appropriate congressional committees, and some of it would—at the least—be
created for internal use with a plan for broader release when possible. This practice
would shift difficult questions about presidential directory power toward more
public, proactive debates, even if the actual use of that power will frequently continue
to be secret, sudden, or reactive.
Congress should strive to exercise its constitutive powers with as much
specificity and foresight as possible and then rapidly revise its approach, as needed,
when exigency strikes.243 This does not mean the body should undersupply national
security tools or attempt to require that the President refer back to Congress before
using capabilities the legislature developed. Rather, it means that presidential power
should operate in the shadow of ongoing statutory authorizations, and that Congress
should consult on and openly deliberate about presidential execution of the laws.244
240. See KENT & MORTENSON, supra note 4, at 283 (“[L]egislative authorization has now become
so comprehensive and open-ended that, while presidential aggrandizement has certainly continued, it
has more typically done so through assertion of statutory authority.”).
241. See Stromseth, supra note 172, at 890 (“[I]t is hard to imagine that [the Founders] would not
have expected the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the country from
serious external threats in emergency situations . . . . The nature of modern military technology, which
confronts us with threats incomparable in their speed and destructive power to those faced in 1789, only
reinforces such an understanding.”).
242. Democratic accountability is not necessarily eroded by a shift of practical war power from
Congress to the President as long as citizens still know what the nation is doing. But, the potential for
democratic breakdown is greater as the President’s role increases because Congress must act through
public laws and the President may act through classified orders and legal opinions.
243. This is one of those sentences that deserves a book-length footnote. For now, I refer the reader
to Philip Bobbitt’s preliminary proposals for a proactive approach to national security, many of them
statutory. See BOBBITT, TERROR & CONSENT, supra note 3, at 412-26.
244. If theses about the eclipse of legality by politicization are correct, then this will pose its own
difficulties. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2311 (2006) (writing that “[f]ew aspects of the founding generation’s political
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Thoughtful congressional authorization—much more so than inaction or retroactive
disapproval—promotes security, imposes limits, and fosters legitimacy. 245
Expanded presidential power and robust constraints on the use of that power, when
both are supplied by an active legislature, can be mutually reinforcing features of the
modern presidency.246
Finally, the courts would be greatly empowered by the additional legal and
statutory products contemplated by these recommendations. Judges would have the
underlying material to more confidently forgo the political question doctrine, and
courts could settle debates first by considering whether the President and Congress
had developed rules for the situation now at hand and, then, by the strength of what
the political branches prepared. This increased judicial involvement would
complement a trend already developing, where courts—sensing the complex nature
of modern war and the need for law to apply—have begun to move away from
categorical, formalist approaches to foreign affairs and national security cases. 247
There is much more to add to these suggestions. Yet I hope this Article—by
identifying and developing certain important themes of the constitutional process
that shapes America’s national security—has made a small contribution that might
prove worthwhile.

theory are now more clearly anachronistic than their vision of legislative-executive separation of
powers. . . . The practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified government thus rivals,
and often dominates, the constitutional distinction between the branches.”). But polarized party politics
is a problem at once greater and meaner than the scope of this Article, and I will not yet accept it is an
axiom of constitutional analysis.
245. In addition to Bobbitt’s suggestions, supra note 243, I refer the reader to Harold Koh’s
guidelines for national security law reform. See KOH, supra note 9, at 161-84. Koh is more skeptical of
the executive branch, and his proposals reflect this skepticism. Yet, regardless of one’s level of
skepticism, many of his suggestions are wisely and appropriately designed to encourage interbranch
dialogue, congressional activity, and public deliberation.
246. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER & CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11 (2012) (describing how the expansion of executive national security powers can be—and
has been—paired with additional oversight and monitoring by a multitude of internal and external
actors).
247. See generally Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes & Converging Domains:
Changing Individual Rights Prots. in National Security & Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029,
1032-33 (2015) (explaining that individual rights in national security and foreign affairs had been based
on “categorical rules and boundary-drawing” but now “previously distinct boundaries are softening and
previously distinct spheres are becoming more alike”).
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